

GAS REGIONAL INITIATIVE NORTH-WEST

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WORK STREAM: INTERCONNECTIONS, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CAPACITY MARKETS

REPORT ON THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE ON INTERCONNECTIONS, PRIMARY AND SECONDARY CAPACITY MARKETS

PART ON THE PRIMARY CAPACITY MARKET

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Introduction

The priority “interconnections, Primary and Secondary Capacity Markets” of the Gas Regional Initiative North-West (GRI N-W) deals with two issues: “interconnections and primary capacity market” (co-lead by CRE (F)) and “interconnections and secondary capacity market” (co-lead by Dte (NL)). The development of this report has been supported by BNetzA.

Workplan and progress

The questionnaires and action reports were discussed in the Implementation Group (IG) and Stakeholders Group (SG) meetings and approved by the Regional Coordination Committee (RCC) on November 21st. The questionnaire on interconnections was sent on 6 November 2006 to the TSOs for answers on 6 December 2006.

Scope of the questionnaire

1. The scope of the questionnaire on “interconnections and primary capacity markets” is the primary capacities¹ at interconnection points between the networks of neighbouring Transmission System Operators (TSOs) in the North/North-West region.



2. As a first step, the work stream focuses on all cross-border points² located at the national borders³ of the countries which participate in the GRI N-W as observer (Norway (N)) or full-members: Ireland (IR), the United Kingdom (UK), Belgium (B), the Netherlands (NL), Germany (G), Denmark (DK), Sweden (S) and France (F).

Map: *The 11 border interfaces regrouping all the 38 cross-border points and*

er.

² A cross-border point is defined as a interconnection points to which one or more TSO(s) are physically interconnected and where only one gas quality can be contractually offered.

³ In a second phase, the scope of the work could expand to all interconnections between TSOs, including the domestic points where two (or more) TSOs are interconnected to.

involving all the 14 TSOs of the GRI N-W.

3. Therefore, as the table below shows there are 11 border interfaces, 18 TSOs involved, 31 cross-border points and 91 border sides⁴.

4. **This document focuses only on 25 interconnections, as answers from EGT and NG are still missing for some cross-border points, as the table shows below. ENI (for Bocholtz) and Dangas (for Ellund) have not been contacted at this stage.**

When the document refers to cross-border points, it relates to the selected 25 cross-border points for which answers have been provided by all adjacent TSOs.

For a better understanding, cross-border points of the GRI N-W have been classified in this report using the GTE classification (See **TABLE** below).

⁴ There are 25 cross-border points with 2 TSOs interconnected, 3 cross-border points with 3 TSOs interconnected and 3 cross-border points with 4 TSOs interconnected. Then, there are $35 \times 2 + 3 \times 3 + 3 \times 4 = 91$ border sides.


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Classification by GTE	Location	interconnected TSOs	
1A	Zeebrugge ZPT	Gassco	Fluxys
1B, 1C	Zeebrugge IZT	Interconnector	Fluxys
2B	Zelzate	Fluxys	GTS
3	Hilvarenbeek	GTS	Fluxys
4	Obbicht	GTS	Fluxys
5	s'Gravenvoeren	GTS	Fluxys
6A, 6B	Eynatten	Fluxys	Wingas
6C, 6D	Eynatten	Fluxys	RWE, EON Gastransport
9A,B	Taisnières H/Quévy H/Blaregnies H	GRTgaz	Fluxys
9C	Taisnières L/Blaregnies L	GRTgaz	Fluxys
10	Bocholtz	GTS	ENI, EON Gastransport
11A	Zevenaar	GTS	EON Gastransport
11B	Zevenaar	GTS	RWE
12	Winterswijk	GTS	E.On Ruhrgas
13A	Oude Statenzijl	GTS	Wingas
13B	Oude Statenzijl	GTS	E.On Ruhrgas
13C, 13D	Oude Statenzijl	GTS	BEB
13E	Oude Statenzijl	GTS	BEB
13 F	Oude Statenzijl	GTS	EWE
14A,C,E	Emden NPT	Gassco	GTS, BEB, EON Gastransport
14B,D,F	Emden EPT1	Gassco	GTS, BEB, EON Gastransport
15	Dornum	Gassco	EON Gastransport
16A, 16B	Ellund	BEB, EON Gastransport	Energinet.dk, Dangas
17	Dragor	Energinet.dk	Nova Naturgas
28	Obergailbach	GRTgaz	GDFDT, EON Gastransport
30	Dunkerque	Gassco	GRTgaz
52A, 52B	Bacton	National Grid	Interconnector
53	Moffat	National Grid	Bord Gais
57	St. Fergus	Gassco	National Grid
78A	Zandvliet H	Fluxys	GTS
78B	Zandvliet L	Fluxys	GTS

Assessment of the importance of TSOs at interconnections

5. The graph below indicates the number of cross-border points (in percentage of all cross-border points of the North-West region) to which TSOs are connected. Taking into account these results, three groups can be identified:



- GTS (NL), FL (B), GSC (N) and EGT (G) are involved in more than 10 cross-border points (more than 25% of cross-border points);


- GRTgaz (F), BEBTS (G), RWETNG (G), NG (UK), WT (G) and ENDK (DK) are connected to less than 10 but more than 2

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cross-border points (more than 5%);

- BG (IR), GDFDT (G), EWEN (G) and NN (S) are operating at only 1 cross-border point.

6. Some TSOs could have a central position due to the number of border sides they control (entry or exit) as shown in the graph below:



GRAPH

4 TSOs (GTS (NL), FL (B), GSC (N) and EGT (G)) represent 67% of all border sides.

Structure of the questionnaire

7. The questionnaire on “interconnections and primary capacity markets” has the following targets.

8. *Capacity products and services offered* at interconnections should be compatible so that trade and competition is not distorted. TSOs and other operators sell different types of capacities, in term of duration (sales of capacity on a multi-yearly, yearly, monthly, daily basis) and firmness (firm or interruptible capacities). These products need to be compatible particularly when gas crosses one or more European networks. Actually, different types of capacities at interconnection points can have a significant impact on cross-border trade; non-discriminatory access; liquidity; security of supply. Therefore, capacities (e.g., technical capacity, booked capacity, available capacity, firm capacity, interruptible capacity, capacities with different durations) should at least be made compatible between interconnected operators.

9. *Allocation rules of capacity and booking rules/procedures* at cross-border points should be coordinated between adjacent TSOs so that trade and competition is not distorted. In order for gas to flow freely, interconnected TSOs should sell services and products in a compatible way – including the way in which capacity is booked and allocated. For example, if TSOs confirm their capacity bookings at different times this may introduce significant risk and uncertainty for the shippers.

Congestion management procedures need to be coordinated so that trade and competition is not distorted. This also includes investment issues. Short term UIOLI (day-ahead use of non nominated capacity and long – term UIOLI) should be coordinated to ensure the free flow of gas. As described above there is a need to sell compatible capacity products in a compatible way- this is equally true for capacity released via UIOLI mechanisms.

10. *Nomination, re-nomination and matching procedures* should be harmonized or at least made compatible at each cross-border point. Differences between nomination, re-nomination and matching procedures may be an impediment to gas flows, where appropriate. It should be made sure that Eassee-gas procedures are implemented.

Goals of this interim report

11. The first goal of this interim report is to identify the generic mismatching issues at interconnections in the GRI N-W and to measure their significance at the regional level (Part A).

12. The second goal consists in pointing out the specific issues related to each cross-border point (Part B).



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Part A General findings in the North-West Regions

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Section 1 – Data confidentiality⁵

For some TSOs, data requested on capacities are published and have been provided (Energinet.dk, GRTgaz, National Grid, Bord Gais and Interconnector). Some other TSOs have provided regulators with all or some data requested on capacities although they are not published or confidential (Gassco, Fluxys, EON Ruhrgas Gastransport, BEB Speicher und Transport, RWE Transportnetz Gas, Wingas Transport).

Confidentiality on Capacities⁶

14. TSOs were given the possibility to indicate which data on technical, firm, firm booked, firm available, interruptible booked, interruptible capacities for entry and exit points and for each month of 2005 are confidential. According to the answers received, the report defines a rate of confidential data which is defined as the amount of data marked “confidential” (corresponding to one adjacent TSO, to one month and to one side of the cross-border point) divided by the amount of monthly data requested.

15. The table below illustrates the different rates of confidential data on technical, firm booked and firm available capacities in the GRI N-W:

	Technical Capacities	Firm Booked Capacities	Firm Available Capacities
Oude (13C,D)	0%	0%	0%
Dunkerque (30)	0%	0%	0%
Zeebrugge ZPT (1A)	0%	0%	0%
Zelzate (2B)	0%	0%	0%
s'Gravenvoeren (5)	0%	0%	0%
Taisnières H (9A,B)	0%	0%	0%
Taisnières L (9C)	0%	0%	0%
Moffat (53)	0%	50%	50%
Bacton (52A,B)	0%	75%	75%
Eynatten (6A,B)	0%	75%	75%
Oude (13B)	13%	13%	13%
Obergailbach (28)	25%	25%	25%
Oude (13A)	25%	63%	63%
Eynatten (6C,D)	33%	33%	33%
Zeebrugge IZT (1B,C)	50%	50%	50%

Graph:

connections, primary and secondary capacity markets.

connections & Primary Capacity Markets



At 1 cross-border point, there are only confidential data (rate of confidential data = 100%).

At 17 cross-border points (68% of all cross-border points) there is a rate of confidential data between 0% and 100%.

At only 7 cross-border points (28 % of all cross-border points) points, all data requested have been provided (rate of confidential data = 0%).

16. In the North-West region, there is a significant generic issue concerning the confidentiality of data on capacities in 2005.


At 17 cross-border points there is at least one data on amount of technical, firm booked or firm available capacities confidential for one of the adjacent TSOs. At one cross-border point, there is only confidential data: *Zevenaar (11B)*. Adjacent TSOs at only 5 cross-border points provided all data on technical, firm booked and firm available capacities: *Zeebrugge ZPT (1A)*, *Zelzate (2B)*, *s'Gravenvoeren (5)*, *Taisnières H (9A,B)*, *Taisnières L (9C)*, *Oude Statenzijl (13C,D)* and *Dunkerque (30)*.

Confidentiality on Utilization Rates⁷

17. TSOs were given the possibility to indicate which data on utilization rates for entry and exit points and for each month of 2005 are confidential. A rate of confidential data can be defined as the amount of data marked "confidential" (corresponding to one adjacent TSO, to one month and to one side of the cross-border point) divided by the amount of monthly data requested.

18. The graph below illustrates the different rates of confidential data on minimum and maximum utilization rates in 2005 in the GRI N-W:

⁷ See question 6.1..



At 16 cross-border points (64% of all cross-border points) there is a rate of confidential data between 0% and 100%.

At 3 cross-border points, there are only confidential data (rate of confidential data = 100%).

At 6 cross-border points (24% of all cross-border points), all data requested have been provided (rate of confidential data = 0%).

19. In the North-West region, there is a significant generic issue concerning the confidentiality of data on utilization rates in 2005.


At 19 cross-border points there is at least one data on minimum or maximum utilization rates confidential. At 3 cross-border points, there are only confidential data: Zevenaer (11A), Zevenaer (11B) and Oude Statenzijl (13F). Adjacent TSOs at only 6 cross-border points provided all data on maximum and minimum utilization rates: Zeebrugge ZPT (1A), Zelzate (2B), s'Gravenvoeren (5), Taisnières H (9A,B), Taisnières L (9C) and Dunkerque (30).

Confidentially on Rates of Subscription⁸

20. TSOs were given the possibility to indicate which data on rates of subscription for entry and exit points and for each month of 2007 are confidential. A rate of confidential data can be defined as the percentage of confidential data (corresponding to one adjacent TSO, to one month and to one side of the cross-border point) to the amount of data requested.

21. The graph below illustrates the different rates of confidential data on rates of subscription for 2007 in the GRI N/N-W:

⁸ See question 7.1..



At 15 cross-border points (60% of all cross-border points) there is a rate of confidential data between 0% and 100%.

At 2 cross-border points, there are only confidential data (rate of confidential data = 100%).

At 8 cross-border points (32% of all cross-border points) points, all data requested have been provided (rate of confidential data = 0%).

22. In the North-West region, there is a significant generic issue concerning the confidentiality of data on rates of subscription for 2007. At 17 cross-border points there is at least one data on rates of subscription confidential. At 2 cross-border points, there is only confidential data: Zevenaar (11A) and Zevenaar (11B). Adjacent TSOs at only 8 cross-border points provided all data on rates of subscription: Zeebrugge ZPT (1A), Zelzate (2B), s'Gravenvoeren (5), Taisnières H (9A,B), Taisnières L (9C), Oude Statenzijl (13A), Obergailbach (28) and Dunkerque (30).

Section 2 – Differences in the Amount and Type of Capacity offered to the Market⁹

⁹ Questions 4.1, 4.2, 4.3. of the questionnaire on Interconnections, Primary and Secondary Markets.

Type of Capacity Products and Services offered¹⁰

23. At 8 cross-border points (32% of all cross-border points) each type of capacity is offered by adjacent TSOs at each side of the border. In the other cases, there is a mismatch in at least one type of capacity products or services which is not offered similarly at every side of the border. For 8 cross-border points (32% of all cross-border points) only four types of capacity products are offered similarly at each side of the border, for 2 cross-border points, three types of capacity products are similarly offered by adjacent TSOs, for 2 cross-border points, two types of capacity products are not offered at each side of the border, while at 1 cross-border point only one type of capacity product is not similarly offered by every adjacent TSO.

24. For the remaining 3 cross-border points one TSO has not answered (IC at Zeebrugge IZT (1B,C)), capacities are allocated for long-term period (NG at Moffat (53)) or one TSO does not allow bookings (NN at Dragor (17)).

25. In the North-West region, there appears to be a concern related to the mismatch in the type of capacity products and services offered at cross-border points. The lack of capacity products at some interconnections may be an impediment to trade. Only at 8 cross-border points all types of capacity products and services are offered at both sides: Zevenaar (11A), Zevenaar (11B), Winterswijk (12), Oude Statenzijl (13A), Oude Statenzijl (13B), Oude Statenzijl (13C,D), Oude Statenzijl (13E) and Oude Statenzijl (13F).


Mismatch in Capacities¹¹

26. Data on technical, firm contracted and firm available capacities have not been provided by a large majority of TSOs. As a consequence, it is only possible to focus on the degree of mismatch of the 6 cross-border points for which data have been provided by all adjacent TSOs. Then, a rate of matching can be defined as the relative difference between the amount of the firm (respectively contracted firm) capacities at one border side and the amount of the firm (respectively contracted firm) capacities at the other border side.

As the graph below shows, there is no systematic relation between the rate of matching of firm capacity and the rate of matching of contracted firm capacity (the first one may be higher or lower than the other depending on the cross-border point considered). In addition, the rates of matching of both firm and firm contracted capacities do not exceed 50%.

¹⁰ See questions 4.1. and 4.2..

¹¹ See question 4.3..



27. Due to the lack of data, any assessment is difficult to make.


Section 3 – Physical congestion and differences in capacity allocation mechanisms¹²

¹² Questions 6.1., 6.2.2., 6.2.3. and 6.2.4. of the questionnaire on interconnections, primary and secondary capacity markets.



Matching of Utilization Rates¹³

28. At the 6 cross-border points where data on the utilization rates have been provided by all adjacent TSOs (See above: Zeebrugge ZPT (1A), Zelzate (2B), s'Gravenvoeren (5), Taisnières H (9A,B), Taisnières L (9C) and Dunkerque (30)), the utilization rates (2005) at each side of the border do not match at any point excepted at Taisnières H (9A,B), as the graph below shows. Where there is a mismatch in the amount of technical capacity, there is often a mismatch of utilisation rates¹⁴.



29. At the cross-border points of the North/North-West region where data have been provided by all adjacent TSOs, there is a significant generic issue concerning the matching of the utilisation rates. At only 1 cross-border point the utilization rates at each border side match.


Physical Congestion Situations

30. When combining the utilization rates (2005) and the level of firm capacity/technical capacity (2005) for the downstream and upstream TSOs which have provided these data and which are interconnected to 6 cross-border points (Zeebrugge ZPT (1A), Zelzate (2B), s'Gravenvoeren (5), Taisnières H (9A,B), Taisnières L (9C) and Dunkerque (30)), some conclusions on probable physical congestion can be made, as the Graph below shows. At every cross-border point, at almost one of the border sides, the total amount of firm capacity has been contracted in 2005. At only 2 cross-border points (Dunkerque (30) and Zeebrugge (1A)) the utilization rates is higher than 90% of the firm capacity, so there is a presumption of physical congestion¹⁵.

¹³ See question 6.1..

¹⁴ In certain cases, utilization rates may not match because technical capacity does not match.

¹⁵ In certain cases, utilization rates may not match because technical capacity does not match.



Allocation Mechanism for existing Capacities¹⁶

32. The allocation mechanism applied or legally required for existing capacities does not match at 4 cross-border points (16% of all cross-border points). For the remaining 21 cross-border points (84% of all cross-border points) the First-Come-First-Served mechanism matches. It has been assumed that FCFS is similarly applied by both of the TSOs at 12 cross-border points to which it is connected.

33. Open Subscription with Pro-Rata is only applied by NG at Bacton (52A,B) and Moffat (53) and by GRTgaz at Taisnières (9A,B), Taisnières (9C), Obergailbach (28) and Dunkerque (30). NG and GC also apply Open Subscription with Ranking (OSWR) at Bacton (52A,B) and Zeebrugge ZPT (1A) respectively.

34. In the North-West region, FCFS mechanisms match the best. Whether the fact that other allocation mechanisms do not match, is an impediment to trade needs to be assessed.

The allocation mechanism applied for existing capacities does not match at Zeebrugge ZPT (1A), Zeebrugge IZT (1B,C), Dragor (17) and Bacton (52A,B).

Coordination of Allocation Mechanisms¹⁷

35. According to matching answers from adjacent TSOs, allocation mechanisms for existing capacities are not coordinated at 24 cross-border points (96% of all cross-border points). At 1 cross-border point, Moffat (53), one of the respondents indicates there is a coordination of allocation mechanism.

¹⁶ See question 6.2.2..

¹⁷ See questions 6.2.3. and 6.2.4..




36. In the North-West region, there is a very significant generic issue concerning the coordination of allocation mechanisms for existing capacities, excepted for only one TSO (BG) at one cross-border point (**Moffat (53)**), where the allocation mechanism is coordinated.

Section 4 – Differences in contractual congestion situations and congestion management procedures¹⁸

¹⁸ Questions 7.1., 7.2., 7.3., 7.4.1., 7.4.2., 7.4.3., 7.4.4., 7.4.5., 7.4.6. of the questionnaire on interconnections, primary and secondary capacity markets.

Matching of Rates of Subscription¹⁹

37. At the 8 cross-border points where data on the rates of subscription have been provided, (See above: Zeebrugge ZPT (1A), Zeebrugge IZT (1B,C), Zelzate (2B), s'Gravenvoeren (5), Taisnières H (9A,B), Taisnières L (9C), Obergailbach (28) and Dunkerque (30)), the rates of subscription (2007) at each side of the border do not match at any point, as the Graph below shows. The rates of subscription (2007) match at 4 cross-border points: Zeebrugge ZPT (1A), Taisnières L (9C), Obergailbach (28) and Dunkerque (30).



38. At the cross-border points of the North/North-West region where data have been provided by all adjacent TSOs, there is a significant generic issue concerning the matching of rates of subscription (2007). The rates of subscription (2007) match at 4 cross-border points: **Zeebrugge (1A), Taisnières L (9C), Obergailbach (28) and Dunkerque (30)**²⁰.

Contractual Congestion

39. In addition, when combining the rates of subscription (2007), the utilization rates (2005) and the level of contracted firm capacity (2005), of downstream and upstream TSOs which have provided these data at 6 cross-border points (Zeebrugge ZPT(1A), Zelzate (2B), s'Gravenvoeren (5), Taisnières H (9A,B), Taisnières L (9C) and Dunkerque (30)), some conclusions on probable contractual congestion situations in 2005 can be made, taking into account possible features for contractual congestions, as the Graph below shows:

- At 3 cross-border points, Zeebrugge ZPT (1A), Zelzate (2B) and Taisnières L (9C), there seems to be a contractual congestion at only the downstream border side (level

¹⁹ See question 7.1..


²⁰ In certain cases, rates of subscription may not match because technical capacity does not match.



of contracted firm capacity equals to or is higher than that of firm capacity, the utilization rate is lower than the level of booked firm capacity):

- At 2 cross-border point, s'Gravenvoeren (5) and Taisnières H (9A,B), there seems to be a contractual congestion situation at only the upstream border side;
- At 1 cross-border point, Dunkerque (30), there is a contractual congestion situation at both sides simultaneously.

In addition to these features indicating contractual congestion situations in 2005, the total amount of firm capacity is already booked for 2007 at Zelzate (2B) which was contractually congested in 2005 at its downstream side, at s'Gravenvoeren (5) which was contractually congested in 2005 at its upstream side and at Zeebrugge ZPT (1A) which was contractually congested in 2005 at both sides.



40. At the 6 cross-border points of the North-West region where data have been provided by all adjacent TSOs, there is a very significant generic issue concerning contractual congestion situations.²¹ In addition to these cross-border points and according to TSO's indication related to other cross-border points where data have not been provided, there would be a contractual congestion at Bocholtz (10), Oude Statenzijl (13B) and Oude Statenzijl (13C,D) at each cross-border side (downstream and upstream)²².

Contractual Congestion Management Procedures²³

²¹ The conclusions in these paragraph are in line with the conclusions made in the report on the secondary market (interconnection capacity), which concludes that a large number of NW-European interconnection points are contractually congested

²² In certain cases, rates of subscription may not match because technical capacity does not match.

²³ See questions 7.2. and 7.3.



41. The contractual congestion procedure applied to existing capacities does not match at 4 cross-border points (16% of all cross-border points). For the remaining cross-border points, there are three possibilities:

- three contractual congestion procedures (firm/interruptible UIOLI and secondary market) match at 8 cross-border points (32% of all cross-border points);
- only two contractual congestion procedures (interruptible UIOLI and secondary market) match at 1 cross-border point;
- only one contractual congestion procedure matches at the remaining 12 cross-border points (48% of all cross-border points). In that case, the contractual congestion procedure is firm UIOLI at 1 cross-border point or secondary market at 11 cross-border points (44% of all cross-border points).

42. According to their respective answers:

- 9 TSOs apply interruptible UIOLI: RWE, EGT, WGT, GTS, GRTgaz, GDFDT, Energinet.dk, NG, and IC.
- Other forms of congestion management are implemented but are seem to be rarely applied.

41. In the North-West region, there is a significant generic issue concerning the matching of contractual congestion procedures for existing capacities. If three contractual congestion procedures match for 35% of all cross-border points, **at almost the majority of the cross-border points (48%), only one contractual congestion procedure matches: firm UIOLI or secondary market.**

Application of short-term and long-term UIOLI procedures²⁴²⁵

43. Short-term and long-term UIOLI are not in place at both side of 15 cross-border points (60%), partly because adjacent TSOs do not apply UIOLI (see above). However, there are:

- 5 cross-border points (20% of all cross-border points) where firm/interruptible short-term and firm long-term UIOLI are in place at both side;
- 1 cross-border point where Interruptible short-term and firm long-term UIOLI are in place at both side;
- 1 cross-border point where only interruptible short-term UIOLI is applied by adjacent TSOs;
- 1 cross-border point where only firm long-term UIOLI is applied by adjacent TSOs.

44. In the North-West region, there is a significant generic issue concerning the matching in the type of UIOLI applied for existing capacities.

When considering only the TSOs applying at least one type of UIOLI, the majority of them has put in place three types of UIOLI procedures (firm/interruptible short-term and firm-long-term UIOLI) at both side of the following cross-border points: Zevenaar (11A), Winterswijk (12), Oude Statenzijl (13B), Oude Statenzijl (13C,D) and Oude Statenzijl (13E).

Interruptible short-term UIOLI procedure is in place as frequently (7 cross-border points) as firm long-term UIOLI.

²⁴ See questions 7.4.1., 7.4.2., and 7.4.3..

²⁵ Please refer to Annex 3, for the definitions of short and long term UIOLI

Coordination of UIOLI procedures²⁶

45. With the exception of 1 cross-border point where one TSO has indicated that short-term UIOLI procedures are coordinated, short-term and long-term UIOLI procedures are not coordinated at all cross-border points.

46. In the North-West region, there is a very significant generic issue concerning the coordination of UIOLI procedures, as UIOLI procedures are not coordinated at all interconnection points. Even when UIOLI procedures are applied, they are not coordinated.


²⁶ See questions 7.4.5. and 7.4.6..

Section 5 – Differences in Capacity Booking Procedures²⁷

²⁷ Questions 5.1., 5.2., 5.3., 5.4., 5.5. of the questionnaire on Interconnections, Primary and Secondary Markets.

Differences in Booking Procedures²⁸

47. The timeframe for booking procedure is rarely the same at each side of the cross-border point as shown in the graph below. For each type and duration of capacity, we define the rate of matching as the number of interconnections points where there are identical answers from all TSOs concerning the time limit for booking divided by the number of interconnections points. For example, a rate of matching equalling 0% would mean that there is no cross-border point where booking procedures match in term of timing constraints and for a given capacity product.



At only 2 cross-border points the timeframe of the booking procedure match for daily firm (Entry or Exit) capacity. The graph shows how this figure varies with the type (firm or interruptible) and the duration (daily, monthly, yearly, multi-yearly) of capacity. The shorter the duration for booking is, the less the timeframe for booking procedure is the same.

48. In the North-West region, there is a significant generic issue concerning the matching in timing constraints of booking procedures, which increases with the duration.

Coordination of Booking Procedures²⁹

49. According to answers from adjacent TSOs, shippers need to book entry/exit capacities to each TSOs separately at 10 cross-border points (40% of all cross-border points), but this

²⁸ See question 5.2..

²⁹ See questions 5.3., 5.4. and 5.5..



booking procedure is not coordinated. For the remaining 14 cross-border points (56% of all cross-border points), answers from neighbouring TSOs are not consistent. The question on coordination of booking procedures is not relevant for adjacent TSOs at 1 cross-border point, Dragor (17).

50. In the North-West region, there is a significant generic issue concerning the coordination of booking procedures, since there is no cross-border point where booking procedures are coordinated. In many cases, shippers have to book to each TSOs separately.

Section 6 – Coordination of Investments in new Capacities³⁰

³⁰ Questions 6.3.1., 6.3.2., 6.3.3., 6.3.4. and 6.3.5 of the questionnaire on interconnections, primary and secondary capacity markets.

Allocation Mechanism of new Capacities³¹

51. At 23 cross-border points (92% of all cross-border points) capacity allocation mechanisms for new capacities do not match.

Only at 2 cross-border points, the answers provided by adjacent TSOs concerning the application of capacity allocation mechanism match:

- At 1 cross-border point, Open Season with Pro Rata is similarly applied at each border side;
- At 1 cross-border point, there is no capacity allocation mechanism applied at both side of the border.

52. At 22 cross-border points (88% of all cross-border points), there is no capacity allocation mechanism legally required, according to answers from adjacent TSOs. At 1 cross-border point, the answers from TSOs do not match concerning the legal requirement existing at each border side. At 2 cross-border points, NG has provided detail on the specific capacity allocation mechanism in place:

- Exit Current Arrangements: parties can agree to an ARCA (Advanced Reservation Capacity Agreement) to secure incremental or new capacity at the cross-border point;
- National Grid NTS exit reform proposal: allowing a User to apply or signal for increased capacity at the cross-border point via a User Commitment model.

53. In the North-West region, there is a very significant generic issue concerning the matching of capacity allocation mechanism applied or legally required, since at most of cross-border points there is **no similar capacity allocation mechanism applied at 92% of all cross-border points and no capacity allocation mechanism legally required at 88% of all cross-border points (in this case, consistency with the gas regulation needs to be assessed).**

Coordination of Short-Term Allocation Mechanism of new Capacities³²

54. At 14 cross-border points (56% of all cross-border points), the answers concerning a coordination of short-term allocation mechanism of new capacities are contradictory. For the remaining 11 cross-border points (44% of all cross-border points) all adjacent TSOs have answered there is no coordination of short-term allocation mechanisms of new capacities.

55. In the North-West region, there is a very significant generic issue concerning the coordination of short-term capacity allocation mechanism, since **at 100% of cross-border points there is no coordination similarly indicated by adjacent TSOs.**

³¹ See question 6.3.3..

³² See question 6.3.4. and 6.3.5..

Section 7 – Coordination of Auctioning Procedures³³

³³ Questions 6.4.1., 6.4.2., 6.4.3., 6.4.4., 6.4.5 and 6.4.6. of the questionnaire on interconnections, primary and secondary capacity markets.

Implementation and coordination of Auctions³⁴

56. At only one border side of 3 cross-border points (12% of all cross-border points), auctions have been undertaken since 2000. For the remaining 22 cross-border points (88% of all cross-border points) no auctions have been undertaken by any adjacent TSO since 2000. Therefore, the question of coordination of auctions is not applicable.

Day-Ahead Capacity Auctions³⁵

60. At 3 cross-border points, day-ahead capacity auctioning (DACA) is not implemented and considered as not feasible by adjacent TSOs. At 8 cross-border points (32% of all cross-border points) DACA is not implemented but considered feasible by one adjacent TSO, while at 7 cross-border points (28% of all cross-border points) it is not implemented but considered feasible by all respondents. At 3 cross-border points (12% of all cross-border points) DACA is implemented by one TSO, while the other TSO considered it feasible.

61. In the North-West region, there is a very significant generic issue concerning the implementation of Day-Ahead Capacity Auctions, since at 72% of all cross-border points it is not implemented. At 12% of all cross-border points DACA is already implemented at only one border side. At 88% of all cross-border points DACA is implemented or considered feasible by at least one adjacent TSO.

³⁴ See questions 6.4.1., 6.4.2. and 6.4.3..

³⁵ See question 6.4.6..

Section 8 – Differences in nominations, re-nominations and matching procedures³⁶

³⁶ Questions 8.1., 8.2., 8.3. and 8.4. of the questionnaire on interconnections, primary and secondary capacity markets.

Easee-gas procedures³⁷

62. At 20 cross-border points (80% of all cross-border points) all TSOs apply Easee-gas nomination, re-nomination and matching procedures. For the remaining 5 cross-border points (20% of all cross-border points), at least one TSO does not apply such procedures: RWE, ENDK, NG and BG.

63. Energinet.dk has indicated that it simplified the procedure and enhanced the flexibility for shippers by allowing them to renominate and have a match made during each hour both before and on the gas day.

64. In the North-West region, there is no significant generic issue concerning the implementation of Easee-gas procedures.

At 80% of all cross-border points the nomination, re-nomination and matching procedures set out by Easee-gas are implemented. Adjacent TSOs do not implemented these procedures at 6 cross-border points: Eynatten (6C,D) and Zevenaar (11B) because of RWE, Dragor (17) because of ENDK, Bacton (52A,B) because of NG and Moffat (53).

³⁷ See questions 8.1. and 8.2..

Part B **Analysis of Specific Issues at each Cross-Border Point in the North-West regions**



Explanation to the following sheets:

Each answer (to the questions 4.1 through 8.4) of each questionnaire (see annex) was compared and confronted with the correlating answer from the adjacent TSOs.

The status indicates one of the following situations:

Match	The answers match and do not seem to imply any problems.
Mismatches	The answers do not match.
Problem /conf	Problems due to confidentiality concerns or missing data
Problem	Other potential problems and issues for possible improvements.

More details and reasons are found in the last column (description).

GAS REGIONAL INITIATIVE NORTH-WEST

Interconnection Point (IP): **1A Zeebrugge ZPT**

between (Countries, TSOs): **N --> B Respondents: Gassco --> Fluxys**

Max. Flowrate in GWh/h: 19 / 28

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Problem	Gassco: no multiyearly firm capacities
4.2 Other offered products		Gassco/Fluxys: no interruptible capacities offered
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	Data provided (but confidential for Gassco)
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	Fluxys: booking only for domestic (also FCFS, OS; Negotiated Access;...)
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	Gassco: Up to 5 weeks ahead of day for daily firm capacities, every April and September for following 2 gas years for monthly firm capacities, every April and September for whole licence period for yearly firm capacities. Fluxys: non-domestic transmission:
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	no for Fluxys, yes for Gassco
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Mismatch	Fluxys entry 36%-67%; Gassco exit 73%-99%.
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Mismatch	Gassco: FCFS, OPWP, OPWR; Fluxys: no CAM applied
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		no
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		Interconnector: Yes; Fluxys: No for domestic transmission, Yes for non domestic transmission
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	Gassco: OSWP & OSWR ; Fluxys: Opens season based on demand (if more capacity required, more capacity will be built)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		no answers
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	Gassco: no ; Fluxys: auctions in Belgium forbidden by law
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction	Problem	no answers
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	no answers
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.	Problem	no answers
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	no answers
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	Gassco: 100%, Fluxys: 100%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied		No relevant
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	Gassco: no answers ; Fluxys: secondary market applied (but firm/interruptible UIOLI legally required)
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	Gassco: UIOLI not applied ; Fluxys interruptible UIOLI or domestic transit
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Mismatch	Gassco: no data, Fluxys: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	Gassco: no answers ; Fluxys: No
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	Gassco: no answers ; Fluxys: No
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Mismatch	Gassco: no answers ; Fluxys: No
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		no answers
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		no answers
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		no answers
8.4 Other information		no answers

Interconnection Point (IP): **1B, 1C** **Zeebrugge IZT**

between (Countries, TSOs): **UK <--> B** Respondents: **Interconnector <--> Fluxys**

Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 2,3
1,0

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Problem	Fluxys: no interruptible products for non-domestic transit, no answer by Interconnector
4.2 Other offered products		none
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem	no data from Interconnector; Fluxys: some firm entry and exit capacity available
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	Interconnector: Firm capacity has been sold on long term contracts. Interruptible capacity is accessed via on-line nominations not via a booking procedure. Fluxys: booking only for domestic (also FCFS, OS; Negotiated Access;...)
5.2 Timing of booking	Problem	Interconnector has not answered; Fluxys: non-domestic transmission: booking deadlines depending on demand and if Open Season; for domestic transmission: booking always possible
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	no
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	Interconnector has not answered; Fluxys: not applicable
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem	Fluxys entry 0-55%, exit 0-65% ; Interconnector entry 0-51%, exit 0-79% -> but no firm capacity available
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	Interconnector has not answered; Fluxys: no
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	Interconnector has not answered; Fluxys: no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		Fluxys: VTNbis + Compression station at Zelzate, Additional capacity from Eynatten to IZT / HUB (forward and reverse) and Additional capacity from Zelzate to IZT / HUB (forward and reverse). Interconnector: A further 2 bcm/y of Belgium to UK capacity will commence operation on 1st October 2007
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Problem	Interconnector: Yes; Fluxys: No for domestic transmission, Yes for non domestic transmission
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	Interconnector: Open Subscription with Pro rata; Fluxys: Opens season based on demand (if more capacity required, more capacity will be built), (Other mechanism applied: First Committed, First Served (Legally required))
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		no answers
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	Interconnector: none, Fluxys: auctions in Belgium forbidden by law



6.4.2 Extent of auctions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction	Problem	Interconnector: No
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	Interconnector: no
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	Interconnector: Capacity has been sold through long term contracts
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	Interconnector: 100%, Fluxys: entry 75-100%, exit 87-100%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	Interconnector: UIOLI is available when additional interruptible capacity is requested by a shipper who is already utilising all his existing firm capacity and non nominated capacity is available. Fluxys: For domestic transmission, procedure applicable at each refusal. For non domestic transmission: no procedure
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	no firm UIOLI (Fluxys only domestic); Interconnector interruptible UIOLI and Secondary Market (SM), Fluxys SM and for domestic transits interruptible UIOLI; UK not legally required, B legally required
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	Interconnector only interruptible short-term UIOLI, Fluxys interruptible UIOLI or domestic transit
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	Interconnector: no data, Fluxys: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem	Interconnector: Hourly, Fluxys: No
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	Interconnector: Yes; Fluxys: No
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		Interconnector procedures exceed Easee-gas CBP by allowing continuous nominations ahead of and during the day.
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		
8.4 Other information		

Interconnection Point (IP): **2B** **Zelzate**

between (Countries, TSOs): **B --> NL** Respondents: **Fluxys --> GTS**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 0,5

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	both offer all firm products for the preferred direction, backhaul on an interruptible basis
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	Fluxys technical (=firm) exit capacity > GTS's (by Factor 1,6) Fluxys' contracted capacity (67% of its technical) is only about 54% (236.700m ³ /h) of GTS's contracted capacity (439.998), which has all firm capacity contracted) GTS: had another 59.375 to 115.625 interruptible entry capacity + 25.103 to 68.109 interruptible exit (backhaul) capacity booked, whilst Fluxys had another 242.520 to 272.520 interruptible entry (backhaul) capacity booked
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	GTS: only booking; Fluxys: booking only for domestic (also FCFS, OS; Negotiated Access;...)
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	GTS: no restriction, except daily cap. products (3 months at the earliest) Fluxys (Entry): depending on demand and if Open Season (Always for domestic); Fluxys (Exit): depending on demand and if Open Season
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	GTS allows separate booking, Fluxys: not applicable
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	No
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates		GTS entry: min. utilization: 0,1%-31,8%; max. util.: 18%-92,5%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	Fluxys exit: min: 0-15,5%; max.: 7-47,5% GTS: only offers FCFS (legally required) Fluxys: FCommittedFS (but only legally required for domestic transportation) + application window for certain services
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases	Match	yes (see website GTS); additional capacity from Zelzate to IZT/Hub (bi-directional) (Fluxys)
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Match	GTS: yes, for the first years all capacity is allocated Fluxys: yes for non-domestic transmission (no, for domestic transmission)



6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Mismatch	both: nothing legally required GTS: only OSubscr.ProRata Fluxys: OSeason; FCommittedFS (legally required)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: means yes (Fluxys denies)
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: optional booking within O.S. on whether they can secure capacity in the neighbouring network. GTS and the neighbouring TSOs coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none (Fluxys: forbidden by law)
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		not applicable
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		not applicable
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		not applicable
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		not applicable
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	both: none implemented, feasible for GTS (but would require considerable adjustments in standard conditions and IT); Fluxys no answer (forbidden by law, see above?)
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	GTS: 100% entry in 2007; Fluxys: 38%-63% exit subscription
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable Fluxys: CMP applicable at each refusal (for domestic transmission), no procedure for non domestic transmission
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	GTS: applies all mentioned CMPs (that are legally required); Fluxys: applies all for domestic transmission (all legally required), but only Secondary Market for non domestic tr.
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GTS: does not apply Interruptible long-term UIOLI Fluxys: applies ONLY interruptible short / long term UIOLI für domestic transmission
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		GTS: 6.709 to 39.443; Fluxys: 0 (not necessary)
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity, if not used firm capacity is available (but re-nomination of firm holders until 2 hours before) Fluxys: no (never?)
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; Fluxys: no
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no coordination
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	both apply Easee-gas
8.2 If not, do they match?		not applicable
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		none
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP): **3** **Hilvarenbeek (Poppel)**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> B** Respondents: **GTS --> Fluxys**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 2,6

Fluxys: IP 3 + IP 78B aggregated data? (now treated as separate but equivalent numeric data)

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	both offer all firm products for the preferred direction, backhaul on an interruptible basis
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential Fluxys technical (=firm) entry capacity: 3.730.000m ³ /h; contracted firm: 104-110%, available: 0, contracted interruptible entry: 0 Fluxys: contracted interruptible backhaul (exit): 29.000 - 190.000m ³ /h
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	GTS: only booking; Fluxys: booking only for domestic (also FCFS, OS; Negotiated Access;...)
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	GTS: no restriction, except daily cap. Products (3 months at the earliest) Fluxys (Entry): depending on demand and if Open Season (Always for domestic); Fluxys (Exit): depending on demand and if Open Season
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	GTS allows separate booking, Fluxys: not applicable
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	No
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential Fluxys entry: min: 0-27,7%; max.: 23-67%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	GTS: only offers FCFS (legally required) Fluxys: FCommittedFS (but only legally required for domestic transportation) + application window for certain services
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		none
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Mismatch	both: nothing legally required GTS: only OSubscr.ProRata Fluxys: OSeason; FCommittedFS (legally required)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: means yes (Fluxys denies)
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: optional booking within O.S. on whether they can secure capacity in the neighbouring network. GTS and the neighbouring TSOs coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none (Fluxys: forbidden by law)



6.4.2 Extent of auctions undertaken		not applicable
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		not applicable
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		not applicable
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		not applicable
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	both: none implemented, feasible for GTS (but would require considerable adjustments in standard conditions and IT); Fluxys no answer (forbidden by law, see above?)
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential ; Fluxys: 70%-75% entry subscription
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable Fluxys: CMP applicable at each refusal (for domestic transmission), no procedure for non domestic t.
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	GTS: applies all mentioned CMPs (that are legally required); Fluxys: applies all for domestic transmission (all legally required), but only Secondary Market for non domestic tr.
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GTS: does not apply Interruptible long-term UIOLI Fluxys: applies ONLY interruptible short / long term UIOLI for domestic transmission
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem / conf	GTS: confidential ; Fluxys: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity, if not used firm capacity is available (but re-nomination of firm holders until 2 hours before) Fluxys: no (never?)
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero" nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; Fluxys: no
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no coordination
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	both apply Easee-gas
8.2 If not, do they match?		not applicable
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		none
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP): **4** **Obbicht**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> B** **Respondents: GTS --> Fluxys**

Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 0,2

Fluxys: IP 4 + IP5 aggregated data? (now treated as separate but equivalent numeric data)

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	both offer all firm products for the preferred direction, backhaul on an interruptible basis (Fluxys entry for domestic also on interruptible basis)
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential Fluxys technical (=firm) entry capacity: 3.730.000m ³ /h; contracted firm: 104-110%, available: 0, contracted interruptible entry: 0
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	GTS: only booking; Fluxys: booking only for domestic (also FCFS, OS; Negotiated Access;...)
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	GTS: no restriction, except daily cap. Products (3 months at the earliest) Fluxys (Entry): depending on demand and if Open Season (Always for domestic); Fluxys (Exit): depending on demand and if Open Season
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	GTS allows separate booking, Fluxys: not applicable
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	No
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential Fluxys entry: min: 0-27,7%; max.: 23-67%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	GTS: only offers FCFS (legally required) Fluxys: FCommittedFS (but only legally required for domestic transportation) + application window for certain services
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		none
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Mismatch	both: nothing legally required GTS: only OSubscr.ProRata Fluxys: OSeason; FCommittedFS (legally required)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: means yes (Fluxys denies)
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: optional booking within O.S. on whether they can secure capacity in the neighbouring network. GTS and the neighbouring TSOs coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none (Fluxys: forbidden by law)



6.4.2 Extent of auctions undertaken		not applicable
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		not applicable
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		not applicable
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		not applicable
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	both: none implemented, feasible for GTS (but would require considerable adjustments in standard conditions and IT); Fluxys no answer (forbidden by law, see above?)
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential; Fluxys: 70%-75% entry subscription
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable Fluxys: CMP applicable at each refusal (for domestic transmission), no procedure for non domestic t.
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	GTS: applies all mentioned CMPs (that are legally required); Fluxys: applies all for domestic transmission (all legally required), but only Secondary Market for non domestic tr.
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GTS: does not apply Interruptible long-term UIOLI Fluxys: applies ONLY interruptible short / long term UIOLI für domestic transmission
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	GTS: confidential; Fluxys: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity, if not used firm capacity is available (but re-nomination of firm holders until 2 hours before) Fluxys: no (never?)
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; Fluxys: no
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no coordination
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	both apply Easee-gas
8.2 If not, do they match?		not applicable
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		none
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP): **5** **s'Gravenvoeren**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> B Respondents: GTS --> Fluxys**

Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: **1,3**

Fluxys: IP 4 + IP5 aggregated data? (now treated as separate but equivalent numeric data)

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	both offer all firm products for the preferred direction, backhaul on an interruptible basis (Fluxys entry for domestic also on interruptible basis)
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential Fluxys technical (=firm) entry capacity: 3.730.000m ³ /h; contracted firm: 104-110%, available: 0, contracted interruptible entry: 0
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	GTS: only booking; Fluxys: booking only for domestic (also FCFS, OS; Negotiated Access;...)
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	GTS: no restriction, except daily cap. Products (3 months at the earliest) Fluxys (Entry): depending on demand and if Open Season (Always for domestic); Fluxys (Exit): depending on demand and if Open Season
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	GTS allows separate booking, Fluxys: not applicable
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	No
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential Fluxys entry: min: 0-27,7%; max.: 23-67%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	GTS: only offers FCFS (legally required) Fluxys: FCommittedFS (but only legally required for domestic transportation) + application window for certain services
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		none
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Mismatch	both: nothing legally required GTS: only OSubscr.ProRata Fluxys: OSeason; FCommittedFS (legally required)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: means yes (Fluxys denies)
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: optional booking within O.S. on whether they can secure capacity in the neighbouring network. GTS and the neighbouring TSOs coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none (Fluxys: forbidden by law)



6.4.2 Extent of auctions undertaken		not applicable
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		not applicable
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		not applicable
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		not applicable
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	both: none implemented, feasible for GTS (but would require considerable adjustments in standard conditions and IT); Fluxys no answer (forbidden by law, see above?)
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential; Fluxys: 70%-75% entry subscription
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable Fluxys: CMP applicable at each refusal (for domestic transmission), no procedure for non domestic t.
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	GTS: applies all mentioned CMPs (that are legally required); Fluxys: applies all for domestic transmission (all legally required), but only Secondary Market for non domestic tr.
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GTS: does not apply Interruptible long-term UIOLI Fluxys: applies ONLY interruptible short / long term UIOLI für domestic transmission
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	GTS: confidential; Fluxys: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity, if not used firm capacity is available (but re-nomination of firm holders until 2 hours before) Fluxys: no (never?)
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; Fluxys: no
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no coordination
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	both apply Easee-gas
8.2 If not, do they match?		not applicable
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		none
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP): 6A, 6B Eynatten

between (Countries, TSOs): **D --> B** **Respondents: Wingas (D) --> Fluxys (B)**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 0,23 B --> D
 0,90 D --> B

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Mismatch	Wingas: all products listed offered; Fluxys: domestic all entry products offered, non-domestic and domestic exit only firm capacities
4.2 Other offered products		
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	mismatch technical and firm capacity entry Fluxys/exit Wingas;contracted entry capacity Fluxys 88 - 102%
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	Wingas: online booking; Fluxys: no online booking for non-domestic transports, no auctions
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	Wingas: Monthly and daily capacity 20 working days ahead, otherwise always; Fluxys: depending on demand and if OS
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	Fluxys: not applicable, Wingas: yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	shippers cannot book Entry and Exit capacities from only one TSO. Wingas: Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		Wingas: The agent has to go through the same procedures as any shipper directly.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	Wingas: no data on exit, Fluxys: entry not available, exit: 0 - 47%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	Wingas: FCFS (legally required) based on online booking, no Open Subscription; Fluxys: none of the listed CAM, Other mechanism applied: FCFS (Not legally required), (Other mechanism applied: FCFS (Legally required) Application window for certain services)
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		Fluxys: VTNbis + Compression station at Zelzate Additional capacity from Eynatten to IZT / HUB (forward and reverse) and Additional capacity from Zelzate to IZT / HUB (forward and reverse)
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Problem	Fluxys: No for domestic transmission, Yes for non domestic transmission
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity		Fluxys: No, Other mechanism applied: Opens season based on demand (if more capacity required, more capacity will be built), (Other mechanism applied: First Committed, First Served (Legally required))
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		



6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	Fluxys: Forbidden by law, Wingas: No auction up to now
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		First come first served based on the online booking system (up to 100 % of firm available capacity)
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	no
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning		Wingas: A feasibility study is currently in process.
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	Wingas exit: 99 - 100%, Fluxys entry: not available; Fluxys exit 38 - 63%, Wingas entry 1%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	Wingas: First come first served based on the online booking system (up to 100 % of firm available capacity), Fluxys: For domestic transmission, procedure applicable at each refusal, for non domestic transmission, no procedure
7.3 CMPs applied	Problem	Wingas: yes (bulletin board); Fluxys: domestic yes, non-domestic no UIOLI (although legally required)
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	Wingas: long-term UIOLI: yes, Fluxys: non-domestic no UIOLI, domestic UIOLI for interruptible capacities
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	Both TSOs: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem	Wingas: Registered shippers can use unused capacity on an interruptible basis taken into account the relevant re-nomination possibility of the firm capacity owner. Fluxys: no
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Problem	Wingas: Registered shippers can use capacity within this "zero-nomination" on an interruptible basis. Fluxys: no
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Eassee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		
8.4 Other information		

Interconnection Point (IP): **6C, 6D** Eynatten

between (Countries, TSOs): **B <--> D** **Respondents: Fluxys (B) <--> E.ON Gastransport (EGT) , RWE (D)**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 0,74 B --> D
 0,32 D --> B

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Problem	Fluxys does not offer interruptible entry and exit capacities for non-domestic transports EGT and RWE offer all listed products
4.2 Other offered products		EGT: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	Technical and firm entry B/exit D do not match, entry D/exit B match; contracted capacity does not match in both directions; some firm capacities available - no EGT exit, RWE confidential
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	No online booking for non-domestic transit for Fluxys; no auctions
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	Timing differs, RWE: min. 1 month ahead
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	No
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		EGT: Any party/company can act as an agent and can offer to book entry and exit capacities for a shipper by providing such service on a commercial basis. RWE: An agent has the possibility to book entry- and exit-capacity from the neighbouring TSO. For our system, the agent additionally has to make a balancing contract and name the balancing operator.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	Fluxys exit max 33%, entry max 45%; EGT exit max 54%, entry confidential; RWE entry confidential, exit no data
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	EGT & RWE: FCFS applied and legally required, Fluxys does not; no Open Subscription
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		EGT: Exit capacity increase to 0,8 Mm ³ /h in 2007, Fluxys: Additional capacity from Eynatten to IZT / HUB (forward and reverse)
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Problem	EGT: yes; Fluxys: No for domestic transmission, Yes for non domestic transmission



6.3.3 CAM for new capacity		no auctions, RWE uses OS, EGT: If new capacity is economic via the respective capacity contracts, such capacity is built. In addition, capacity from the border to the virtual trading point is built at border-crossing points where spare pipeline capacity is persistently below 10% and appropriate spare capacity is available on the other side of the border; Fluxys: Opens season based on demand (if more capacity required, more capacity will be built), (Other mechanism applied: First Committed, First Served (Legally required))
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	Never, in B forbidden by law
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		There are no legally binding thresholds.
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	Day ahead capacity not implemented but feasible, EGT and other N/NW operators are working on a study on co-ordination of day-ahead capacity, Fluxys has not answered
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	RWE: confidential; EGT 100% Jan - Sep (New calculation model Oct - Dec), Fluxys entry 71% - 100% exit 48% - 66%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Mismatch	RWE: > 90 %; A congestion management procedure is applied, EGT: CMP is applied at any booking level, Fluxys: For domestic transmission, procedure applicable at each refusal, for non domestic transmission, no procedure
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	RWE, EGT: applied and legally required (EGT: bulletin board), Fluxys: no UIOLI (although legally required), SM
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	D: yes, B: non-domestic no, domestic interruptible yes
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		E.ON: 0,29 - 1,19 Mio; RWE, Fluxys: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem	RWE: There are no known differences between the long-term- and short-term-UIOLI definitions described in the annex. We consider our procedure for interruptible capacity to be applicable for short-term UIOLI., EGT: A shipper who has booked interruptible capacity can use unused capacity under the applicable procedures for allocation of interruptible capacities. Such use needs to be in line with the applicable nomination/renomination procedures in accordance with the respective EASEE-gas CBP on nomination and matching (see answer to question 8)., Fluxys: no
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Problem	RWE, Fluxys: no, EGT: yes
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		



8.1	Easee-gas procedures applied	Problem	RWE: no; EGT, Fluxys: yes
8.2	If not, do they match?		
8.3	Suggestions for improvement		EGT: We are in a continuous process of improving our capacity calculation methods as well as our capacity booking procedures under consultation with networkusers. In line with the results of this process, we e.g. changed our methods and procedures on 01.11.2004, 01.02.2006, and 01.10.2006. Major further changes are envisaged for 01.10.2007, when we will reduce the number of entry/exit systems (market areas) from 3 to 1 for our H Gas grid.
8.4	Other information		EGT: While discussing changes in methods for firm capacities on the primary market, the primary goal of this type of capacity as a reliable and secure service should be kept in mind.

Interconnection Point (IP): 9 A B TaisnièresH/Quévy H/Blaregnies H

between (Countries, TSOs): **B -> F** **Respondents: Fluxys (B) -> GRTgaz (F)**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio m³/h: 1,10 B -> F

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Mismatch	Fluxys does not offer interruptible capacities; GRTgaz does not offer daily firm, monthly interruptible and yearly interruptible entry and exit capacities
4.2 Other offered products		
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	technical capacity: GRTgaz exit 0 - Fluxys 2.860.000/not available; other direction match
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	GRTgaz: online booking and auctions (Auction only on daily firm capacities available); Fluxys: no online booking, no auctions, only Open season
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	Fluxys: depending on demand and if open season; GRT differing
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	GRTgaz: yes; Fluxys: not applicable
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	GRTgaz: no; Fluxys: not applicable
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		GRTgaz: Booking procedures are not yet coordinated but GRTgaz and Fluxys work on this way
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Mismatch	exit SEGEO 8-103%, Troll 0-89%; GRTgaz entry 21-84%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Mismatch	GRTgaz: FCFS and open subscription with pro rata (not legally required); Fluxys: none of the listed CAM applied (FCFS is legally required)
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GRTgaz: considered reverse capacities; Fluxys: no
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		no
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	GRTgaz: CAM will be defined when new capacity will be needed; Fluxys: Open seasons based on demand (if more capacity required, more capacity will be built)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	GRTgaz: only short-term daily auctions since 17th November 2006; Fluxys: forbidden by law
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		GRTgaz: no significant experience
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction	Problem	GRTgaz: no
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	GRTgaz: no
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	GRTgaz: Day-ahead capacity auctions implemented; Fluxys: no
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	GRTgaz: entry 41-71%, Fluxys SEGEO exit 79%; Troll exit 100%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GRTgaz: There is daily interruptible UIOLI and long-term UIOLI for contractual congestion, without specific stage of congestion (level of utilization). Releasable capacities can be provided to shippers: these capacities are given by shippers that have a large rate of capacities in an entry or exit point, whatever the use of it. Fluxys: No procedure
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	GRTgaz: Interruptible UIOLI, SM ans releasable capacities applied; Fluxys SM; F none of them requested by law, B all listed CMP legally required
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GRTgaz: interruptible short term and firm long term UIOLI applied; Fluxys: none of the listed applied
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	no data
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem	GRTgaz: When nomination is lower than capacity booking and immediately as soon as there is no more available daily capacity; Fluxys: no
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GRTgaz: yes; Fluxys: no
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		
8.4 Other information		

GAS REGIONAL INITIATIVE NORTH-WEST



Interconnection Point (IP):		9C	<u>Taisnières L/Blaregnies L</u>
between (Countries, TSOs):		B -> F	Respondents: Fluxys -> GRTgaz
Max. Flowrate in Mio mN ³ /h:		0,95	
Question	Status	Description	
Capacity Products & Services offered			
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Mismatch	GRTgaz: only monthly, yearly and multiyearly firm capacity offered; Fluxys: non-domestic no interruptible offered, domestic all listed products offered. There is no interruptible capacity offered by GRTgaz because all the capacity is offered on a firm basis	
4.2 Other offered products			
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	Figures do not match	
Capacity Booking Procedure			
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	GRTgaz: online booking and auctions (Auction only on daily firm capacities available); Fluxys: no online booking, no auctions, only Open season	
5.2 Timing of booking	Problem	Fluxys: depending on demand and if open season; GRT differing	
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	GRTgaz: yes; Fluxys: not applicable	
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	GRTgaz: no; Fluxys: not applicable	
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		GRTgaz: Booking procedures are not yet coordinated but GRTgaz and Fluxys work in this way.	
Phys. Congestion & CAM			
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates		GRTgaz: entry 32-90 %, Fluxys: exit 0-72 %	
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Mismatch	GRTgaz: FCFS and open subscription with pro rata (not legally required); Fluxys: none of the listed CAM applied (FCFS is legally required)	
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no	
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination			
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		Fluxys: No for domestic transmission Yes for non domestic transmission	
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?			
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	GRTgaz: CAM will be defined when new capacity will be needed; Fluxys: Open seasons based on demand (if more capacity required, more capacity will be built)	
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	no	
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination			
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since 00	Problem	GRTgaz: only short-term daily auctions since 17th November 2006; Fluxys: forbidden by law	
6.4.2 Extent of auctions undertaken		GRTgaz: no significant experience	
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction	Problem	GRTgaz: no	
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	GRTgaz: no	
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.			
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	GRTgaz: Day-ahead capacity implemented; Fluxys: no answer	
Contractual Congestion & CMP			
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007		GRTgaz: entry 81-91%; Fluxys: exit 89%	
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GRTgaz: There is daily interruptible UIOLI and long term UIOLI for contractual congestion, without specific stage of congestion (level of utilisation). Releasable capacities can also be provided to shippers : these capacities are given by shippers who have a large rate of capacities in an entry or exit point, whatever the use of it. Fluxys: For domestic transmission, procedure applicable at each refusal For non domestic transmission, no procedure	
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	GRTgaz: Interruptible UIOLI, SM ans releasable capacities applied; Fluxys SM; F none of them requested by law, B all listed CMP legally required	
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GRTgaz: interruptible short term and firm long term UIOLI procedures are in place and interruptible short-term is applied; Fluxys: none of the listed applied	
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		GRTgaz: no data; Fluxys: 0	
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	GRTgaz: When nomination is lower than capacity booking and immediately as soon as there is no more available daily capacity; Fluxys: n/a (non-domestic), no (domestic)	
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GRTgaz: yes; Fluxys: no	
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no	
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination			
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching			
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes	
8.2 If not, do they match?			
8.3 Suggestions for improvement			
8.4 Other information			

Interconnection Point (IP): **10** **Bocholtz**

Respondents: **Gas Transport Services (NL) (GTS) --> E.ON Gastransport (D) (EGT)**
 NL --> D
 between (Countries, TSOs):
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 1,47

Attention: a German TSO / capacity holder (ENI) ist missing in the evaluation!

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	EGT offers all listed capacity Products GTS does not offer entry capacities
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points EGT: Freely allocable capacities as well as capacities subject to allocation restrictions are offered in line with the German Network access regulation.
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	data on exit capacities is confidential on both sides EGT: No firm entry capacity available
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking: yes, auction: no
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	GTS' Exit capacities can be booked partly 3 months in advance at the earliest, otherwise with no restriction EGT Exit and Entry capacities can be booked partly 20 working days before, otherwise with no restriction
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	Yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	No, EGT states that shippers can book entry and exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		EGT: Any party/company can act as an agent and can offer to book entry and exit capacities for a shipper by providing such service on a commercial basis.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	EGT entry: March 49 %, Nov - Dec. 109%, no data by GTS Exit capacities: confidential
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Match	FCFS: applied (EGT: online booking) and legally required, OS: No
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	No
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GTS: yes, EGT: no
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		GTS: for the first year all capacity is allocated
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity		GTS: OS with Pro Rata
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	GTS. Yes, EGT: No
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: Parties participating in the open season were offered to make their booking optional (until a certain deadline) on whether they are able to secure capacity in the network of the neighbouring TSO. GTS and the neighbouring network

		operators coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	None
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	Day-ahead capacity is not implemented but feasible GTS: Day-ahead auctions are in principle feasible, but would require considerable adjustment in standard conditions and IT systems EGT: EGT and other N/NW operators are working on a study on co-ordination of day-ahead capacity.
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	EGT Entry: Jan until Sep 100%, Oct until Dec not available due to foreseen change in calculation model GTS Exit: confidential, EGT Exit: not available
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	EGT: FCFS in combination with online booking at any booking level
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	All listed CMP applied and legally required. EGT: Bulletin board
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied		UIOLI is in place (Mistake in definition!)
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem / conf	GTS: confidential, EGT: 0,13 - 0,24 Mio
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Match	(EASEE-gas : 2 hours)
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match	yes
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	No
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Eassee-gas procedures applied	Match	Yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		EGT: We are in a continuous process of improving our capacity calculation methods as well as our capacity booking procedures under consultation with network users. In line with the results of this process, we e.g. changed our methods and procedures on 01.11.2004, 01.02.2006, and 01.10.2006. Major further changes are envisaged for 01.10.2007, when we will reduce the number of entry/exit systems (market areas) from 3 to 1 for our H Gas grid.
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment. EGT: While discussing changes in methods for firm capacities on the primary market, the primary goal of this type of capacity as a reliable and



GAS REGIONAL INITIATIVE NORTH-WEST



secure service should be kept in mind.

Interconnection Point (IP): **11A** **Zevenaar**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> D** **Respondents: GTS --> E.ON**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: **2,53** **Gastransport**

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	all products offered
4.2 Other offered products		GTS offers also wheeling and diversion services. EGT: Freely allocable capacities as well as capacities subject to allocation restrictions are offered in line with the German network access regulation.
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	GTS exit confidential/no data; EGT firm entry 100% booked, no interruptible capacity contracted
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking, no auctions. GTS also accepts booking by fax, email and letter (Contract Data Sheets will need to be signed).
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	daily firm: GTS 3 months in advance, EGT 20 workingdays in advance
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?		yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no, EGT: Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		EGT: Any party/company can act as an agent and can offer to book entry and exit capacities for a shipper by providing such service on a commercial basis.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	confidential/not available
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.		FCFS (legally required, EGT in combination with online booking), no OS
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GTS: Yes. Please see the information provided on the GTS website. EGT: no
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		GTS: For the first years all capacity is allocated.
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	GTS: OS with pro rata, no auctions, not legally required; EGT: If new capacity is economic via the respective capacity contracts, such capacity is built. In addition, capacity from the border to the virtual trading point is built at border-crossing points where spare pipeline capacity is persistently below 10% and appropriate spare capacity is available on the other side of the border.
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: yes EGT: no



6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: Parties participating in the open season were offered to make their booking optional (until a certain deadline) on whether they are able to secure capacity in the network of the neighbouring TSO. GTS and the neighbouring network operators coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments.
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	None
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	Day ahead capacity not implemented but feasible, GTS: Day-ahead auctions are in principle feasible, but would require considerable adjustment in standard conditions and IT systems. EGT: E.ON Gastransport and other N/NW operators are currently working on a study on co-ordination of day ahead capacity.
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	EGT: entry 100% Jan - Sep, not available Oct - Dec (change in network calculation model), GTS exit confidential
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable; EGT: As given in our answer to question 6.2.2, first committed – first served is applied in combination with online booking. This congestion management procedure is applied at any booking level
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	yes
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	GTS: no interruptible long term, otherwise yes
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem / conf	GTS: confidential, EGT: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Match	EASEE-gas standards
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match	yes
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		EGT: We are in a continuous process of improving our capacity calculation methods as well as our capacity booking procedures under consultation with network users. In line with the results of this process, we e.g. changed our methods and procedures on 01.11.2004, 01.02.2006, and 01.10.2006. Major further changes are envisaged for 01.10.2007, when we will reduce the number of entry/exit systems (market areas) from 3 to 1 for our H Gas grid.



8.4 Other information

GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment. EGT: While discussing changes in methods for firm capacities on the primary market, the primary goal of this type of capacity as a reliable and secure service should be kept in mind.

Interconnection Point (IP): **11B** **Zevenaar**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> D** **Respondents: GTS --> RWE**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 2,53 (incl. IP 11A)

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	GTS: all products offered, RWE: all entry products offered
4.2 Other offered products		GTS offers also wheeling and diversion services.
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	data confidential or not available
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking, no auctions, GTS also accepts booking by fax, email and letter (Contract Data Sheets will need to be signed).
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	GTS: daily capacities 3 months in advance, otherwise no restriction; RWE: different
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no, RWE: Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		RWE: An agent has the possibility to book entry- and exit-capacity from the neighbouring TSO. For our system, the agent additionally has to make a balancing contract and name the balancing operator.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	confidential
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Match	FCFS (legally required), no UIOLI
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GTS: Yes. Please see the information provided on the GTS website.
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		For the first years all capacity is allocated.
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity		no auctions, OS with pro rata (RWE also with ranking)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	GTS: yes, RWE has not answered
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		Parties participating in the open season were offered to make their booking optional (until a certain deadline) on whether they are able to secure capacity in the network of the neighbouring TSO. GTS and the neighbouring network operators coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments.
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		RWE: we apply the FCFS rule in combination with online booking procedures (there are no binding tresholds)
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		



6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	Day ahead capacity not implemented but feasible, GTS: Day-ahead auctions are in principle feasible, but would require considerable adjustment in standard conditions and IT systems
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	confidential
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	RWE: > 90 %; A congestion management procedure is applied, GTS has not answered
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	yes (all listed)
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GTS: no interruptible long-term UIOLI, RWE: no short-term UIOLI
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem / conf	GTS: confidential; RWE: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?		GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity that they will be awarded if shippers with firm capacity rights do not use their capacity. Shippers holding firm capacity can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of gas transport (EASEE-gas standard). RWE: There are no known differences between the long-term- and short-term-UIOLI definitions described in the annex. We consider our procedure for interruptible capacity to be applicable for short-term UIOLI.
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GTS. Yes, RWE. No
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Mismatch	GTS: yes, RWE: no
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP): **12** **Winterswijk (Vreden)**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> D** **Respondents: GTS --> EGT**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 1,75

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	both offer all products for the preferred direction, but backhaul on a firm basis only possible by EGT
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points EGT: Freely allocable capacities as well as capacities subject to allocation restrictions are offered in line with the German network access regulation.
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential EGT: 18 GW technical (= firm) entry capacity; 95% contracted, 1 GW available, infinite interruptible available, but 10 MW contracted
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	both: only booking
5.2 Timing of booking	Match	GTS: no restriction, except daily cap. Products (3 months at the earliest) EGT: no restriction, except daily & monthly 20 working days before
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	possible
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	Not coordinated; but EGT allows booking via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		EGT: Any party/company can act as an agent and can offer to book entry and exit capacities for a shipper by providing such service on a commercial basis.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	GTS (exit): all data confidential EGT (entry): min: 0-54%; max.: 18-90%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Match	both apply only FCFS, which is legally required (EGT in combination with online-booking)
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases	Mismatch	yes (see website GTS); EGT: no
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		GTS: yes, for the first years all capacity is allocated
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem / conf	GTS: nothing legally required GTS: only OSubscr.ProRata EGT: no data (capacity contracts)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: means yes (EGT denies)
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: optional booking within O.S. on whether they can secure capacity in the neighbouring network. GTS and the neighbouring TSOs coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none (EGT: other (?) specific CMP applied)



6.4.2 Extent of auctions undertaken		20times) not applicable
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		not applicable
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		not applicable
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		not applicable
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	both: none implemented, but feasible for both EGT: see current day ahead capacity study GTS (but would require considerable adjustments in standard conditions and IT); Fluxys no answer (forbidden by law, see above?)
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential EGT: 99% entry in 2007 until Sept. (afterwards change in network calculation model)
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable EGT: only FCommittedFS at any booking level
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	both: all mentioned CMPs applied (EGT offers bulletin board on its website + German TSOs Trac-X for secondary trading)
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GTS: does not apply Interruptible long-term UIOLI EGT: applies all UIOLI
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	GTS: confidential EGT: 10 MW
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Match Problem	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity, if not used firm capacity is available (but re-nomination of firm holders until 2 hours before) EGT: as Easee-gas CBP
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match Problem	both: yes GTS explanation: yes, but shippers with firm rights can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of transport
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no coordination
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	both apply Easee-gas
8.2 If not, do they match?		not applicable
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		EGT: improving our capacity calculation methods & capacity booking procedures under consultation with network users
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment. E.ON: security of service should be kept in mind

Interconnection Point (IP): **13 A** Oude Statenzijl

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL <--> D** Respondents: **GTS <--> Wingas**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 0,75

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	all listed products offered
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	Mismatches, confidential data
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking, no auctions, booking by fax, email
5.2 Timing of booking	Problem	GTS: daily capacities 3 months in advance, otherwise no restriction; Wingas: daily and monthly capacities 20 working days ahead; otherwise no restriction
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no, Wingas: Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		Wingas: the agent has to go through the same procedures as any shipper directly
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	often confidential;
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Match	FCFS applied and legally required, no open subscription
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GTS: yes
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Problem	GTS: For the first years all capacity is allocated
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	no auctions, GTS: Open season withpro rata (not legally required); Wingas: FCFS / Grid construction on request
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; Wingas: no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: Parties participating in the open season were offered to make their booking optional (until a certain deadline) on whether they are able to secure capacity in the network of the neighbouring TSO. GTS and the neighbouring network operators coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		Wingas: FCFS served based on the online booking system (up to 100% of firm available capacity)
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		no
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		



6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	no day-ahead capacity implemented; GTS: Day-ahead auctions are in principle feasible, but would require considerable adjustment in standard conditions and IT systems, Wingas: A feasibility study is currently in process
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Mismatch	GTS entry 0%, Wingas exit 29-33%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	Wingas: First come first served based on the online booking system (up to 100 % of firm available capacity)
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	listed CMP applied and legally required
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	firm long-term UIOLI equally applied; GTS: short-term applied, Wingas interruptible long-term applied
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	GTS: 0-46914, Wingas 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Match	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity that they will be awarded if shippers with firm capacity rights do not use their capacity. Shippers holding firm capacity can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of gas transport (EASEE-gas standard). Wingas: Registered shippers can use unused capacity on an interruptible basis taken into account the relevant re-nomination possibility of the firm capacity owner.
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match	GTS: yes, Shippers nominating indicate that they will not use their capacity; therefore shippers holding interruptible capacity are awarded these rights. However, the shipper with firm rights can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of transport. Wingas: Registered shippers can use capacity within this "zero-nomination" on an interruptible basis.
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Eassee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP): **13 A** **Oude Statenzijl**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL <--> D** **Respondents: GTS <--> E.ON**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: **0,75** **Gastransport**

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	all products offered
4.2 Other offered products		GTS offers also wheeling and diversion services. EGT: Freely allocable capacities as well as capacities subject to allocation restrictions are offered in line with the German network access regulation.
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	technical mismatch, GTS entry/EGT exit 0 available
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking, no auctions. GTS also accepts booking by fax, email and letter
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	daily firm: GTS 3 months in advance, EGT 20 workingdays in advance
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no, EGT: Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		EGT: Any party/company can act as an agent and can offer to book entry and exit capacities for a shipper by providing such service on a commercial basis.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	entry confidential; GTS exit 2-38%, EGT exit 0-53%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.		FCFS (legally required, EGT in combination with online booking), no OS
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GTS: Yes EGT: Exit capacity increase to 1,5 Million m ³ /h in 2007
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Problem	GTS: For the first years all capacity is allocated. EGT: yes
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	GTS: OS with pro rata, no auctions, not legally required; EGT: If new capacity is economic via the respective capacity contracts, such capacity is built. In addition, capacity from the border to the virtual trading point is built at border-crossing points where spare pipeline capacity is persistently below 10% and appropriate spare capacity is available on the other side of the border.
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: yes EGT: no



6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: Parties participating in the open season were offered to make their booking optional (until a certain deadline) on whether they are able to secure capacity in the network of the neighbouring TSO. GTS and the neighbouring network operators coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments.
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	None
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		EGT: first served is applied in combination with online booking. In such case there is no auctioning applicable.
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	Day ahead capacity not implemented but feasible, GTS: Day-ahead auctions are in principle feasible, but would require considerable adjustment in standard conditions and IT systems. EGT: E.ON Gastransport and other N/NW operators are currently working on a study on co-ordination of day ahead capacity.
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	EGT: entry and exit 100% Jan - Sep, not available Oct - Dec (change in network calculation model), GTS entry 100%, exit 38-100%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable; EGT: As given in our answer to question 6.2.2, first committed – first served is applied in combination with online booking. This congestion management procedure is applied at any booking level
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	yes
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	GTS: no interruptible short term, otherwise yes
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		GTS: 51.907-99.588, EGT: 0,69-1,44 Mio
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Match	EASEE-gas standards
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match	yes
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		EGT: We are in a continuous process of improving our capacity calculation methods as well as our capacity booking procedures under consultation with network users. In line with the results of this process, we e.g. changed our methods and procedures on 01.11.2004, 01.02.2006, and 01.10.2006. Major further changes are envisaged for 01.10.2007, when we will reduce the number of entry/exit systems (market areas) from 3 to 1 for our H Gas grid.

8.4 Other information

GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment. EGT: While discussing changes in methods for firm capacities on the primary market, the primary goal of this type of capacity as a reliable and secure service should be kept in mind.

Interconnection Point (IP): 13 C D Oude Statenzijl

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL <--> D** Respondents: **GTS <--> BEB**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: NL -> D 0,40
 D -> NL 0,10

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	all listed products offered
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points; BEB: BEB offers most of its capacities as fully flexible entry- and exit capacities. But furthermore BEB offers conditional capacities with respect to the German regulation about access to pipeline (paragraph 6). This conditional capacity is not fully flexible
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	technical and firm capacities do not match; no BEB firm capacity available;
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking, no auctions
5.2 Timing of booking	Problem	Deadlines for daily and monthly do not match, monthly and yearly without restriction
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no; BEB: Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		BEB: Every person or organisation can act as an agent and can book entry and/or exit capacities and sell this combined capacity to others
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem	GTS: entry Nov and Dec min >120%, max >200%, exit 3-28%; BEB: exit 43-188%, entry 38.83%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	FCFS (legally required), no open subscripiton
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GTS: yes
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Problem	GTS: For the first years all capacity is allocated
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Match	no auctions; GTS: open subscription with pro rata, BEB: open subscription with ranking (CAM are not legally required)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; BEB: no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: Parties participating in the open season were offered to make their booking optional (until a certain deadline) on whether they are able to secure capacity in the network of the neighbouring TSO. GTS and the neighbouring network operators coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		BEB: Because BEB applies a real-time online booking system BEB is not obliged to start auctions



6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	Day ahead capacity not implemented but feasible, GTS: Day-ahead auctions are in principle feasible, but would require considerable adjustment in standard conditions and IT systems
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	BEB entry and exit: 100%, GTS: mainly confidential, otherwise exit 39%, entry 0
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	BEB: Because BEB applies a real-time online booking system BEB is not obliged to start auctions.
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	firm and interruptible UIOLI, SM (all of them legally required)
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Match	yes
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		GTS: 40295-134709, BEB: 0-860 MWh/h
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity that they will be awarded if shippers with firm capacity rights do not use their capacity. Shippers holding firm capacity can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of gas transport (EASEE-gas standard). BEB: not answered
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match	GTS: yes, Shippers nominating indicate that they will not use their capacity; therefore shippers holding interruptible capacity are awarded these rights. However, the shipper with firm rights can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of transport. BEB: yes, Interruptible capacity
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Eassee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		BEB: Non-regulated tariffs for primary capacity which reflect the real market value of capacities would be an improvement for the primary market. This kind of tariffs could be formed in auctions.
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP): **13 E** **Oude Statenzijl**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> D** Respondents: **GTS --> BEB**

Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: **NL -> D 0,80**

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	GTS: All exit products offered, BEB: all entry products offered
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points; BEB: BEB offers most of its capacities as fully flexible entry- and exit capacities. But furthermore BEB offers conditional capacities with respect to the German regulation about access to pipelines (paragraph 6). This conditional capacity is not fully flexible. In addition BEB offers reverse flow capacity at entry and exit points which are not physical bidirectional.
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking; no auctions GTS: booking by fax, email and letter
5.2 Timing of booking	Problem	GTS: daily capacity 3 months in advance, otherwise without restriction, BEB: daily capacity: 20 working days ahead, monthly capacity 1 month: 20 working days ahead at the earliest ; More than 1 month: 3 months ahead at the earliest
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no, BEB: Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		BEB: Every person or organisation can act an agent and can book entry- and/or exit capacities as representative for a third person and sell these combined capacities to others.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	GTS: exit confidential, BEB: Jan - Sep: n/a, Oct - Dec 4 - 67%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	FCFS (legally required), no open subscription, BEB has a real-time online booking system introduced
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?		no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GTS: yes, BEB: no
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		GTS: For the first years all capacity is allocated
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Match	no auctions; GTS: open subscription with pro rata, BEB: open subscription with ranking (CAM are not legally required)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; BEB: no



6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: Parties participating in the open season were offered to make their booking optional (until a certain deadline) on whether they are able to secure capacity in the network of the neighbouring TSO. GTS and the neighbouring network operators coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		BEB: Because BEB applies a real-time online booking system BEB is not obliged to start auctions
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	Day ahead capacity not implemented but feasible, GTS: Day-ahead auctions are in principle feasible, but would require considerable adjustment in standard conditions and IT systems
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	BEB: entry 100%, GTS: confidential
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	Because BEB applies a real-time online booking system BEB is not obliged to start auctions.
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	firm and interruptible UIOLI, SM (all of them legally required)
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Match	yes
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem / conf	GTS: confidential; BEB: 22-254 MWh/h
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem	Shippers can always book interruptible capacity that they will be awarded if shippers with firm capacity rights do not use their capacity. Shippers holding firm capacity can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of gas transport (EASEE-gas standard). BEB has not answered
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match	GTS: yes, Shippers nominating indicate that they will not use their capacity; therefore shippers holding interruptible capacity are awarded these rights. However, the shipper with firm rights can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of transport. BEB: yes, Interruptible capacity
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		BEB: Non-regulated tariffs for primary capacity which reflect the real market value of capacities would be an improvement for the primary market. This kind of tariffs could be formed in auctions.
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP):	<u>13 F</u>	<u>Oude Statenzijl</u>
between (Countries, TSOs):	NL --> D	Respondents: GTS --> EWE
Max. Flowrate in Mio mN ³ /h:	0,6	
Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products &		
Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	GTS: all listed entry and exit products offered, EWE: confidential
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	GTS: confidential; EWE: no firm capacity available
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking, no auctions
5.2 Timing of booking	Problem	GTS: daily capacity 3 months in advance; EWE: confidential
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	all data confidential
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	FCFS (legally required), no open subscription
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GTS: yes
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Problem	For the first years all capacity is allocated
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity		GTS: open season with pro rata
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	GTS: yes, EWE has not answered the question
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: Parties participating in the open season were offered to make their booking optional (until a certain deadline) on whether they are able to secure capacity in the network of the neighbouring TSO. GTS and the neighbouring network operators coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since 00	Problem	none
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		EWE: confidential
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem / conf	GTS: Day-ahead auctions are in principle feasible, but would require considerable adjustment in standard conditions and IT systems; EWE: confidential
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	GTS: confidential; EWE confidential
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: Not applicable. EWE: confidential
7.3 CMPs applied	Problem / conf	Firm UIOLI. GTS: interruptible UIOLI and SM (required by law); EWE: Confidential
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	GTS: short- and log-term UIOLI; EWE only firm long-term UIOLI
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem / conf	GTS: confidential, EWE: confidential
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem / conf	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity that they will be awarded if shippers with firm capacity rights do not use their capacity. Shippers holding firm capacity can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of gas transport (EASEE-gas standard). EWE: Confidential
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Problem / conf	GTS: yes, Shippers nominating indicate that they will not use their capacity; therefore shippers holding interruptible capacity are awarded these rights. However, the shipper with firm rights can re-nominate until 2 hours before the hour of transport; EWE: confidential
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		

Interconnection Point (IP): 16A, 16B Ellund

between (Countries, TSOs): **D <--> DK** Respondents: **E.ON Gastransport, BEB <--> Energinet.dk**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 0,34 DK --> D
 0,20 D --> DK **Attention: a German TSO / capacity holder (Dong) ist missing in the evaluation!**

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Match	Exit Energinet.dk – Entry EGT, BEB: All products offered Entry Energinet – Exit EGT: All products offered BEB does not offer any firm exit products
4.2 Other offered products		Energinet.dk: Weekly product, where the week can start on any day. capacities subject to allocation restrictions are offered in line with § 6 GasNZV by BEB and EGT
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	Attention: a German TSO / capacity holder (Dong) ist missing in the evaluation! Therefore: Technical capacity does not match in both directions Firm capacity does not match in both directions Contracted firm capacity is not identical on both sides of the point Energinet.dk has a somewhat higher amount of Entry capacity available than EGT has exit capacity. BEB has no exit available.
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	The operators do not use auctions as booking procedure. Energinet.dk: Shippers can book Firm Capacity: 1) as per email order and receive an order confirmation within one business day; and 2) by request and receive an offer within three business days. Interruptible capacity is offered response to all orders and requests when no more uninterruptible capacity is available. Auction or other alternative capacity allocation procedures are under consideration within ENDK and together with BEB and E.ON Ruhrgas GT under the GRI N/N-W operators study on Day-ahead capacity auctions.
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	Some capacity products can be booked consistent and without restriction. Others do not match and can be booked either 20 working days before or when no more firm capacity is available.
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	Shippers can book entry and exit capacities to each TSO separately.
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	Shippers cannot book Entry and Exit capacities from only one TSO, but all TSO offer Entry and Exit capacities booking via a third party



5.5 Explanation of book coordination	Mismatch	<p>BEB: Every person or organisation can act as an agent and can book entry and/or exit capacities as representative for a third person and sell these combined capacities to others.</p> <p>Energinet.dk: New products and concepts have historically been implemented coordinated with BEB. However, no large changes have been necessary in one system to support new products in the neighbouring TSO-system. Energinet.dk is very positive towards more coordination and a common and more market supportive capacity allocation mechanism than the current where shippers have to consult one TSO in Denmark and three TSOs in Germany in order to get the right capacities . Energinet.dk. BEB will meet and discuss these issues on an ongoing basis and as soon as possible.</p> <p>EGT: Any party/company can act as an agent and can offer to book entry and exit capacities for a shipper by providing such service on a commercial basis.</p>
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	<p>BEB minimum and maximum utilization rate January – September: Confidential</p> <p>Energinet.dk has not answered concerning entry capacity</p> <p>BEB has not answered concerning exit capacity</p> <p>EGT exit capacity: confidential</p>
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Match	<p>Capacity allocation mechanisms are mostly conform on both sides of the border</p> <p>In Denmark FCFS is not legally required, in Germany it is.</p> <p>Other mechanisms:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Energinet.dk: UIOLI and optimisation for each gas hour. o EGT: FCFS is offered in combination with online booking o BEB has a real-time online booking system introduced.
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	All TSOs: No
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases	Problem	All TSOs: No
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	<p>Energinet.dk applies no capacity allocation mechanisms for new capacities and none of them is legally required</p> <p>BEB uses open subscription with ranking</p> <p>EGT: If new capacity is economic via the respective capacity contracts, such capacity is built. In addition, capacity from the border to the virtual trading point is built at border-crossing points where spare pipeline capacity is persistently below 10% and appropriate spare capacity is available on the other side of the border.</p>
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	All TSOs: No



6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination	Problem	BEB: Never Energinet.dk: No EGT: None, specific congestion management methods have been applied more than 20 times for our grid since 2000
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	no indication
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction	Problem	Because BEB applies a real-time online booking system, BEB is not obliged to start auctions. Energinet.dk: current contract has to be dealt with if auctions are introduced. It is not possible to estimate the potential thresholds herein before there is an auction allocation mechanism draft concept. EGT: FCFS is applied in combination with online booking. In such case there is no auctioning applicable.
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	No co-ordination of auctions between adjacent TSOs
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	No day-ahead capacity implemented Feasible
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	Attention: a German TSO / capacity holder (Dong) ist missing in the evaluation! Rate of subscription differs Q4/2007, E.On is going to change network calculation model à possibly not agreed with Energienet.dk (also decreasing entry/exit subscription rates in Q4) ? BEB has no firm exit capacity at this point
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Mismatch	Prevailing CMP at German side: First committed first served + online booking (legal measure §10 (4) GasNZV prescribes an auction (once a year), if more or equal to 90%, but less then 100% of technical capacity is booked, but (BEB) feels not obliged to such auctions, since they apply a real-time online booking system) DK: sells 2 levels of interruptible capacity and can initiate UIOLI by shippers requests
7.3 CMPs applied	Match	Firm + interruptible UIOLI + secondary market applied (as legally required in GER) GER: TSO's bulletin board + German Trac-X DK: nominations on interruptible capacity (2 different levels and priorities)
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Match	(Problems with definition of FST + IST UIOLI in annex)
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		Mismatch of amounts on both sides (likely to be due to non-combined entry/exit products?)
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Match	(EASEE-gas : 2 hours)
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match	yes, on an interruptible basis
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Mismatch	all no (but for short term UIOLI yes Energinet.dk)
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI		Misunderstanding by DK



coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Ease-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		<p>Suggested Improvements (different):</p> <p>BEB: Non-regulated tariffs (auctions)</p> <p>DK: investments, coordination (intelligent matchin set-up), auction models</p> <p>E.ON: improving capacity calculation models</p>
8.4 Other information		<p>Other :</p> <p>DK: market players view points</p> <p>E.ON: security of service</p>

Interconnection Point (IP):		IP 17 Dragor
between (Countries, TSOs):		DK >> S Respondents: Energinet.dk >> NovaNaturgas
Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h:		0,29
Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Mismatch	No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. Explanation: The market modell in Sweden differs from the one used in most other european countries. The swedish modell implicates that the capacity booked by the end user at the closest network owner includes capacity in the whole swedish network - including the transmission network. This means that the supplier in the interconnection point Dragor has access to the whole swedish system - without having to book any capacity (no entry, no exit). The supplier only sells gas to the end customer. If the customer changes supplier, the network booking is left uneffected. Correspondingly contractual congestion is not likely to occur. (And therefore the role "shipper" is not relevant to use in the swedish modell/system, only "supplier".) Energinet offers all products listed
4.2 Other offered products	Problem / conf	Energinet.dk: Weekly product, where the week can start on any day.
4.3 Capacities: Quantities		No data concerning interruptible capacity No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	Sweden: No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1. Energinet.dk: Online booking. Shippers can book Firm Capacity: 1) as per email order and receive an order confirmation within one business day; and 2) by request and receive an offer within three business days. Interruptible capacity is offered response to all orders and requests when no more uninterruptible capacity is available. Auction or other alternative capacity allocation procedures are under consideration within ENDK and together with BEB and E.ON Ruhrgas GT under the GRI N/W operators study on Day-ahead capacity auctions
5.2 Timing of booking	Problem	No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1. Energinet.dk: Firm capacities are available without restriction; interruptible capacity is available, when no firm capacity is available.
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	The answers do not match. Energinet.dk states, that a shipper can book entry and exit capacities to each TSO separately. NovaNaturgas answers that this is not possible. No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.		Accordant to Energinet.dk shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party.
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		NovaNaturgas: Exit capacity bookings in Dragor can be made by shippers on the Danish side of the Dragor. No entry capacity bookings in Dragor are made on the Swedish side. No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Mismatch	
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.		Energinet.dk applies FCFS. The other listed mechanisms are not used. Sweden: No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1. Energinet. UIOLI and optimisation for each gas hour. The listed mechanisms are not legally required on both sides.
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	The mechanisms are not applied coordinated between TSOs. No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination	Problem	NovaNaturgas increased capacity in 2006 and answered that Energinet.dk has done preparations for a further increase. Energinet.dk states that no increases in capacity are planned in the immediate future because there is no bottleneck. However, if needed it is possible to expand capacity at Dragor.
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?	Problem	The listed mechanisms are neither applied nor legally required. No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity		
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	Short-term allocation mechanisms for new capacity are not coordinated between adjacent TSOs. No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination	Problem	No auctions have been undertaken. No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00		
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		Energinet.dk: current contract has to be dealt with if auctions are introduced. It is not possible to estimate the potential thresholds herein before there is an auction allocation mechanism draft concept.
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		NovaNaturgas: No. No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	Both TSOs: No
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning		No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1. Energinet.dk: Day-ahead firm capacities can be ordered from Energinet.dk 1% business day before the gas day on a FCFS basis. All capacity can be traded between shippers on the CTF with the same time frame. Auctioning of day ahead capacity over the border would probably in principle be possible if a more detailed analysis showed this outcome. However, as there currently is neither a contractual nor physical bottleneck the question is if it is currently necessary to introduce any other allocation mechanism than FCFS at Dragor.
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	Sweden: No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1. Contractual congestion is not likely to occur. / Energinet. only Exit-Capacity subscriptions (<= 65%)
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Mismatch	Nova Naturgas: No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1. DK: sells 2 levels of interruptible capacity and can initiate UIOLI by shippers requests
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	Nova Naturgas: No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1. DK: applies all, nominations on interruptible capacity (2 different levels and priorities), no indication regarding legal requirements
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	DK has all UIOLI in place., No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		No indication
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem	DK: EASEE-gas : 2 hours), No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Problem	DK: yes, S: No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Mismatch	(regarding coordination of short term UIOLI), both don't coordinate long-term UIOLI. No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination	Problem / conf	No capacity bookings are done by shippers in Sweden. See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Problem / conf	(DK implements Easee-gas)
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		DK: see above
8.4 Other information		See explanation of market modell in section 4.1.

GAS REGIONAL INITIATIVE NORTH-WEST

Interconnection Point (IP):		
	IP 28	Obergailbach/Medelsheim
between (Countries, TSOs):	D -> F	Respondents: E.ON Gastransport (EGT), Gaz de France Deutschland Transport (GDFDT) -> GRTgaz
Max. Flowrate in Mio m ³ /h:	1,6	
Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim Cap.	Problem	GRTgaz does not offer monthly interruptible capacities; GDFDT offers all listed capacity products, EGT offers all listed products
4.2 Other offered products		GDFDT: Weekly (firm-interruptible). Redirection. Remark : at this point the entry capacity is virtual (reverse flow). EGT: Freely allocable capacities as well as capacities subject to allocation restrictions are offered in line with the German Network access regulation.
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	technical/firm capacities entry GRTgaz and exit EGT/GDFDT do not match; little GRTgaz firm entry capacity available, EGT available and contracted firm exit capacity do not equal the total firm capacity
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Problem	online booking, GDFDT and GRTgaz: auctions
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	deadlines differ significantly
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no; EGT: Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		EGT: Any party/company can act as an agent and can offer to book entry and exit capacities for a shipper by providing such service on a commercial basis.
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	EGT: entry confidential, exit 21-307%; GRTgaz: entry Jan - Sep n/a, Oct - Dec 26-99%; GDFDT: Jan - Sep entry and exit n/a, Oct - Dec no data on entry, exit 34-94%. Comments: GDFDT activities began in October 2005; entry capacities to GDFDT network are only virtual and depend on the amount of nominations on exit capacities.
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	FCFS (in D legally required), GRTgaz: open subscription with pro rata GDFDT: Auction, according to german law (cf. § 10 Gasnetzzugangsverordnung), EGT: FSFC is offered in combination with online booking
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		GDFDT: To the 1st of December 2008 : from 18.126.464 to 22.612.864 m ³ /h, GRTgaz: Open season in 2005 for new capacities after 2008. Increase of 220 GWh/d instead of 430 GWh/d.; EGT: Exit capacity increase to 0,4 Mm ³ /h in 2008
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		yes, GRTgaz: Yes, after 2008, up to 80% already allocated (with an open season in 2005).
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity		GDFDT: auction (legally required) and FCFS (that is the normal mechanism : auction only in case of physical congestion, cf. § 10 GasNZV); GRTgaz: open season with pro rata, EGT: If new capacity is economic via the respective capacity contracts, such capacity is built. In addition, capacity from the border to the virtual trading point is built at border-crossing points where spare pipeline capacity is persistently below 10% and appropriate spare capacity is available on the other side of the border.
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since 00	Problem	GDFDT: Once in July 2005 for October 2005. GRTgaz: Only short term daily auctions since 17th November 2006, not already applied at Obergailbach. EGT: none
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		GDFDT: 90-100%; GRTgaz: no; EGT: FCFS is offered in combination with online booking. In such case there is no auctioning applicable.
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	no
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	GRTgaz: day-ahead capacity implemented; EGT: Day ahead capacity not implemented but feasible. EGT and other N/NW operators are working on a study on co-ordination of day-ahead capacity.; GDFDT: It is not feasible yet because we don't have the system, the resources...
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	GDFDT: exit 100%; GRTgaz: entry 85-100%, exit 0%; EGT: entry and exit 100%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GDFDT: When more than 90% and less than 100% of technical capacity is already booked. GRTgaz: There is daily interruptible UIOLI and long term UIOLI for contractual congestion, without specific stage of congestion (level of utilisation). Releasable capacities can also be provided to shippers : these capacities are given by shippers who have a large rate of capacities in an entry or exit point, whatever the use of it. EGT: FCFS is applied in combination with online booking. This congestion management procedure is applied at any booking level (see also answer to question 6.4.3).
7.3 CMPs applied	Problem	EGT: all CMP listed, bulletin board, GRTgaz: interruptible UIOLI, SN (not legally required); GDFDT: SM and UIOLI
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	interruptible short-term UIOLI applied; GDFDT and GRTgaz do not apply firm short-term and interruptible long-term UIOLI
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		GDFDT began activities in Oct 2005, 0 in Oct, Nov, Dec; GRTgaz: no data, EGT: 0,46-0,84 Mio
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?		EGT: A shipper who has booked interruptible capacity can use unused capacity under the applicable procedures for allocation of interruptible capacities. Such use needs to be in line with the applicable nomination/renomination procedures in accordance with the respective EASEE-gas CBP on nomination and matching; GRTgaz: When nomination is lower than capacity booking and immediately as soon as there is no more available daily capacity.
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Match	yes
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	yes
8.2 If not, do they match?		
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		EGT: We are in a continuous process of improving our capacity calculation methods as well as our capacity booking procedures under consultation with network users. In line with the results of this process, we e.g. changed our methods and procedures on 01.11.2004, 01.02.2006, and 01.10.2006. Major further changes are envisaged for 01.10.2007, when we will reduce the number of entry/exit systems (market areas) from 3 to 1 for our H Gas grid.
8.4 Other information		EGT: While discussing changes in methods for firm capacities on the primary market, the primary goal of this type of capacity as a reliable and secure service should be kept in mind.

GAS REGIONAL INITIATIVE NORTH-WEST

Interconnection Point (IP): **30 Dunkerque**

between (Countries, TSOs): **N --> F Respondents: Gassco --> GRTgaz**

Max. Flowrate in GWh/h: **24 / 26**

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Problem	Gassco: no multiyearly firm capacities & no interruptible capacities ; GRTgaz: no monthly interruptible capacities
4.2 Other offered products		
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	Data provided (but confidential for Gassco)
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Match	booking procedure applied
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	Gassco: Up to 5 weeks ahead of day for daily firm capacities, every April and September for following 2 gas years for monthly firm capacities, every April and September for whole licence period for yearly firm capacities. GRTgaz: from 20th M-1 to 21 hours
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?		yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem	GRTgaz entry 67%-94%; Gassco exit 73%-98%.
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Mismatch	Gassco & GRTgaz: FCFS, OPWP ; In addition, GRTgaz: OSWR
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		no answers
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		Interconnector: Yes; Fluxys: No for domestic transmission, Yes for non domestic transmission
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Problem	Gassco: OSWP & OSWR ; GRTgaz: not already defined
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	no
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		no answers
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	Gassco: no ; GRTgaz: only short term daily auctions since 17th November 2006
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction	Problem	no
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	no
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.	Problem	no
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	no
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	Gassco: 100%, GRTgaz: 98%
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	No relevant
7.3 CMPs applied	Problem	no answers
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	no answers
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	no answers
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Problem	no answers
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Problem	no answers
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no answers
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination	Problem	no answers
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Eassee-gas procedures applied	Problem	Gassco: yes ; GRTgaz: no answer
8.2 If not, do they match?		no answers
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		no answers
8.4 Other information		no answers

GAS REGIONAL INITIATIVE NORTH-WEST

Interconnection Point (IP): <u>52A, 52B</u> Bacton		
between (Countries, TSOs):	UK <-> UK	Respondents: National Grid (NG) <-> Interconnector (IC)
Max. Flowrate in Mio m ³ /h:	2,4 (A) 1,88 (B)	
Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Mismatch	Firm Interconnector capacity sold out until 2018, interruptible capacity available each day on hourly basis. NG: offers long term capacity from y+2 for 15 years ahead, medium term capacity for y+1&2 and a daily firm product. A daily interruptible product is also offered. Only yearly firm capacity for Exit which is to be changed as part of current exit reform proposals
4.2 Other offered products		
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	Technical capacity: Entry Interconnector > Exit NG; Users may flow on an interruptible basis volumes greater than the 15.7 GWH/h. National Grid is obliged to offer 25.98 GWH/h (firm) as part of new Licence proposals. Entry NG > Exit Interconnector (doubled in Nov./Dec. 05) Entry capacity is at an aggregated system entry point not individual IUK point level. NG: technical capacity = firm capacity No further information on contracted capacities etc. from Interconnector doesn't allow further comparison
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	Interconnector: only long term firm capacity contracts; interruptible capacity via on-line nominations (not booking) NG: offers also Auctions; Uniform Network Code signatories access the NG Link system via secured network to book capacity
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	Interconnector: no data (since sold out in long term contracts) NG entry: daily: D-1 to D, monthly: M-24 to M-1, yearly: Y-15 to Y-2 ahead NG exit: yearly: M-6 to D-5
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	Interconnector: no separate booking, NG: yes
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem / conf	Interconnector: no data, NG: no coordination
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination	Problem	Interconnector & NG: no coordination, due to long term contracts (for Interconnector)
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	Interconnector: Entry: 0-79%, Exit 0-100%. NG: all data confidential
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Mismatch	CAM: Interconnector: no data NG: legally required for exit FCFS. & for entry open subscription with ranking via pay as bid auction..
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	Both: CAMs are not coordinated NG (although a check for exit capacity is currently in place).
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases	Mismatch	Interconnector: 2 bcm/a from Belgium to UK from 1st Oct. 2007 NG: none at Bacton as capacity exists to accommodate increase.
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		Interconnector: 2 bcm/a already allocated
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Mismatch	Interconnector: only Open Subscription with Pro rata is applied, no (specific) CAM legally required NG: auction process for (incremental) Entry capacities; Advanced Reservation Capacity Agreement to secure new capacity at Exit (proposal: User Commitment model)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Problem	Both say, that short-term CAMs are not coordinated
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Mismatch	Interconnector: no auctions have been undertaken NG: Long & medium term auctions annually, daily short term auctions
6.4.2 Extent of auctions undertaken		NG is obliged to sell 80% of baseline Entry quantity in long term auctions, the rest is for medium term auctions (remaining unsold cap. for short term auctions); Exit: currently no auctions (but planned) No threshold for starting an auction
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		No coordination of auctions with adjacent TSOs
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning		
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Mismatch	Interconnector = 100%, NG still has >30% entry available (exit not published)
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Mismatch	Interconnector: UIOLI available when additional (to already utilized existing firm) interruptible capacity is requested by a shipper and non-nominated c. is available NG: Entry: UIOLI after 30 days rolling average of unused capacity offered to the market as day ahead (can be scaled back by NG); Exit: interruptible contracts (buy back from Okt. 2010)
7.3 CMPs applied	Problem	Both only apply interruptible (short term) UIOLI (only for entry @ NG, tradeable) + Sec. Market Problem: definition in annex None legally required (but Int. UIOLI by NG)
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	Both have so far only interruptible short-term UIOLI in place (but NG offers options & forwards contracts for the rights to reduce Entry capacity; Exit reform intends to introduce similar arrangements from 2009 for NTS Exit Points)
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Mismatch	No seized capacity for Interconnector NG: (fluctuating; for entry UIOLI 30 days rolling; exit: no UIOLI, but planned) UIOLI not really seized as original holder of firm capacity could renominate the firm upwards.
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	Interconnector: hourly NG: day ahead for 6:00 on the day
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	Interconnector: yes NG: no, but the shipper can renominate upwards later in the day (see 7.4.2.).
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	both don't coordinate both UIOLI
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Eassee-gas procedures applied	Mismatch	Eassee-gas procedures only applied by Interconnector. NG considers that the UK noms/renomination regime affords Users with far more flexibility than that provided by the Eassee-Gas CBP. Users can always raise a UNC Modification Proposal if they believe that the UK regime should adopt the Eassee-Gas CBP.
8.2 If not, do they match?	Mismatch	Interconnector: procedures exceed Eassee-gas CBP by allowing continous nominations day ahead and during the day NG: No harmonisation to EASEE-Gas CBP; Differences managed by agents (on behalf of shippers)
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		NG raised a Modification Proposal to reform exit capacity regime
8.4 Other information		

GAS REGIONAL INITIATIVE NORTH-WEST

Interconnection Point (IP):		53	Moffat
between (Countries, TSOs):		UK --> IRL	Respondents: National Grid (NG) --> Bord Gais (BG)
Max. Flowrate in Mio m ³ /h:		1,24 (incl. IP 54)	
Question	Status	Description	
Capacity Products & Services offered			
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Mismatch	BG: offers only yearly + multiyearly firm (entry + exit) capacity, whereas NG only offers yearly firm (exit only) capacity	
4.2 Other offered products		BG: also offers Entry Point Transfers, Entry Capacity Trades, Backup Entry Capacity, Additional Exit capacity (during the Gas Year until the end of a G.Y.)	
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Mismatch	Technical (=firm) capacity: Entry BG > Exit NG (by factor of almost 15). The exit capacity from UK is aggregated to the NW LDZ total – not a Moffat single figure. National Grid is obliged to offer 18.06 GWH/h (firm) as part of new Licence proposals. contracted/available capacities: BG had 18-34% available firm entry capacity, NG: missing information interruptible cap.: NG offers about 14% of its techn. Capacity as interruptible capacity	
Capacity Booking Procedure			
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	BG: only booking (for entry), exit capacity is sold on a different basis NG: not only booking, but UNC signatories have access to the NG UK Link System via a secured network both: no auctioning (NG reforming exit arrangements to include auctions)	
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	BG: yearly/multiyearly firm entry: 1st of each month NG: yearly firm exit: M-6 to D-5	
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Problem	both can book Entry / Exit to each TSO separately	
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	no coordinated booking procedures BG: shippers can book via a third party	
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination			
Phys. Congestion & CAM			
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	BG: Entry: 27-60%; NG: no data available	
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Mismatch	both apply FCFS BG: obligation to quote NG: applies also OSPR (both legally required); exit reform proposal would introduce a pay-as-bid auction	
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	BG: says there is a coordination; NG denies it, although a check is in place currently	
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		BG: Ticket to Ride process in place (matched upstream and downstream); currently no congestion both: none planned	
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases			
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?			
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Mismatch	BG: not available (since currently no congestion) NG: current arrangements (Advanced Reservation Capacity Agreement to secure increment capacity (proposal: User Commitment model)	
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	BG: no data NG: says no coordination	
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination			
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since 00	Problem	both: no auctions currently (BG: since there is no congestion) NG: proposal to introduce auctions for medium & short term capacity from 2008 for 1st of oct. 2010	
6.4.2 Extent of auctions undertaken			
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction			
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?	Problem	No coordination of auctions with adjacent TSOs	
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.			
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Mismatch	both: not implemented BG: not feasible, NG: feasible	
Contractual Congestion & CMP			
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	BG: all data confidential; NG: not available	
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Mismatch	BG: not available (currently no congestion) NG: interruptible contracts enforced to manage exit constraints (proposal to replace interruptible contracts with market mechanism (buy back) from Okt. 2010)	
7.3 CMPs applied	Problem	BG: no data on UIOLI & legal measures. There is trading on Sec. Markets, shippers can nominate in excess of their active entry capacity NG: None applied, none legally required (currently interruptible contracts manage constraints. Exit reform proposal is to introduce UIOLI in 2010 & introduce options and forwards contracts for the rights to reduce exit capacity part of proposal)	
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Problem	Both seem to have none (for BG see 7.3.)	
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized		not available (see above)	
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?		not available (see above)	
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?		not available (see above)	
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?		BG: not available (see above); NG: no coordination	
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination			
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching			
8.1 Eassee-gas procedures applied	Problem	both: Eassee-gas procedures are not applied NG considers that the UK noms/renomination regime affords Users with far more flexibility than that provided by the Eassee-Gas CBP. Users can always raise a UNC Modification Proposal if they believe that the UK regime should adopt the Eassee-Gas CBP.	
8.2 If not, do they match?	Mismatch	both: no statement, if they match BG: Code of operations specifies nomination deadline: 10.00 on D-1; renomination from 18.00 on D-1 to 01:45 on D (shippers shall ensure Zero Imbalance Position) NG: No harmonisation to EASEE-Gas CBP; Differences managed by agents (on behalf of shippers)	
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		NG raised a Modification Proposal to reform exit capacity regime	
8.4 Other information			

Interconnection Point (IP): **78A** **Zandvliet H**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> B Respondents: GTS --> Fluxys**
 Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 0,2

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Problem	both offer all products for the preferred direction, except Fluxys "non-domestic" offers only firm products
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential Fluxys: about 70% available firm capacity; 0 contracted interruptible
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	GTS: only booking; Fluxys: booking only for domestic (also FCFS, OS; Negotiated Access;...)
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	GTS: no restriction, except daily cap. Products (3 months at the earliest) Fluxys (Entry): depending on demand and if Open Season (Always for domestic)
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	GTS allows separate booking, Fluxys: not applicable
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	No
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential, Fluxys: 0-50%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	GTS: only offers FCFS (legally required) Fluxys: FCommittedFS (but only legally required for domestic transportation) + application window for certain services
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		none
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Mismatch	both: nothing legally required GTS: only OSubscr.ProRata Fluxys: OSeason; FCommittedFS (legally required)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: means yes (Fluxys denies)
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: optional booking within O.S. on whether they can secure capacity in the neighbouring network. GTS and the neighbouring TSOs coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments
6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none (Fluxys: forbidden by law)
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		not applicable
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		not applicable
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		not applicable



6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		not applicable
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	both: none implemented, feasible for GTS (but would require considerable adjustments in standard conditions and IT); Fluxys no answer (forbidden by law, see above?)
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem	GTS: all data confidential, Fluxys: 28% entry subscription
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable Fluxys: CMP applicable at each refusal (for domestic transmission), no procedure for non domestic t.
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	GTS: applies all mentioned CMPs (that are legally required); Fluxys: applies all for domestic transmission (all legally required), but only Secondary Market for non domestic tr.
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GTS: does not apply Interruptible long-term UIOLI Fluxys: applies ONLY interruptible short / long term UIOLI für domestic transmission
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem / conf	GTS: no data ; Fluxys: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity, if not used firm capacity is available (but re-nomination of firm holders until 2 hours before) Fluxys: no (never?)
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; Fluxys: no
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no coordination
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Eassee-gas procedures applied	Match	both apply Eassee-gas
8.2 If not, do they match?		not applicable
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		none
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Interconnection Point (IP): **78B** **Zandvliet L**

between (Countries, TSOs): **NL --> B** Respondents: **GTS --> Fluxys**

Max. Flowrate in Mio mN³/h: 0,11

Fluxys: IP 3 + IP 78B aggregated data? (now treated as separate but equivalent numeric data)

Question	Status	Description
Capacity Products & Services offered		
4.1 Offered types of Prim.Cap.	Problem	both offer all products for the preferred direction, except Fluxys "non-domestic" offers only firm products (backhaul direction only offered as firm products by Fluxys)
4.2 Other offered products		GTS: wheeling and diversion for specific combinations of entry and exit points
4.3 Capacities: Quantities	Problem	GTS: all data confidential Fluxys: about 105% contracted firm capacity, none more available; backhaul direction: 30.000m ³ /h contracted as interruptible exit capacity
Capacity Booking Procedure		
5.1 Applied booking procedure	Mismatch	GTS: only booking; Fluxys: booking only for domestic (also FCFS, OS; Negotiated Access;...)
5.2 Timing of booking	Mismatch	GTS: no restriction, except daily cap. Products (3 months at the earliest) Fluxys (Entry): depending on demand and if Open Season (Always for domestic)
5.3 Separate Entry/Exit booking?	Mismatch	GTS allows separate booking, Fluxys: not applicable
5.4 Coordinated Booking Proced.	Problem	No
5.5 Explanation of book. coordination		
Phys. Congestion & CAM		
6.1 Min. & Max. utilization rates	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential, Fluxys: 0-67%
6.2.2 CAM applied for existing cap.	Problem	GTS: only offers FCFS (legally required) Fluxys: FCommittedFS (but only legally required for domestic transportation) + application window for certain services
6.2.3 CAM applied coordinated?	Problem	no
6.2.4 Explanation of CAM Coordination		
6.3.1 Planned capacity increases		none
6.3.2 New cap. already allocated?		
6.3.3 CAM for new capacity	Mismatch	both: nothing legally required GTS: only OSubscr.ProRata Fluxys: OSeason; FCommittedFS (legally required)
6.3.4 Short-term CAM coordinated?	Mismatch	GTS: means yes (Fluxys denies)
6.3.5 Explanation of Coordination		GTS: optional booking within O.S. on whether they can secure capacity in the neighbouring network. GTS and the neighbouring TSOs coordinate a.o. the capacities and the timing of new investments



6.4.1 Amount of auctions since '00	Problem	none (Fluxys: forbidden by law)
6.4.2 Extent of acutions undertaken		not applicable
6.4.3 Binding threshold for auction		not applicable
6.4.4 Auctions coordinated?		not applicable
6.4.5 Explanation of auction coord.		not applicable
6.4.6 Day ahead auctioning	Problem	both: none implemented, feasible for GTS (but would require considerable adjustments in standard conditions and IT); Fluxys no answer (forbidden by law, see above?)
Contractual Congestion & CMP		
7.1 Rates of subscription 2007	Problem / conf	GTS: all data confidential, Fluxys: 75% entry subscription
7.2 Stage, at which CMP is applied	Problem	GTS: not applicable Fluxys: CMP applicable at each refusal (for domestic transmission), no procedure for non domestic t.
7.3 CMPs applied	Mismatch	GTS: applies all mentioned CMPs (that are also legally required); Fluxys: applies all for domestic transmission (all legally required), but only Secondary Market for non domestic tr.
7.4.1 Short/long term UIOLI applied	Mismatch	GTS: does not apply Interruptible long-term UIOLI Fluxys: applies ONLY interruptible short / long term UIOLI für domestic transmission
7.4.2 Amount monthly seized	Problem	GTS: no data; Fluxys: 0
7.4.3 UIOLI after how much time?	Mismatch	GTS: Shippers can always book interruptible capacity, if not used firm capacity is available (but re-nomination of firm holders until 2 hours before) Fluxys: no (never?)
7.4.4 D-1 "Zero"nomination = UIOLI?	Mismatch	GTS: yes; Fluxys: no
7.4.5 short/long t. UIOLI coordinated?	Problem	no coordination
7.4.6 Explanation of UIOLI coordination		
Nomination, Re-Nomination & Matching		
8.1 Easee-gas procedures applied	Match	both apply Easee-gas
8.2 If not, do they match?		not applicable
8.3 Suggestions for improvement		none
8.4 Other information		GTS: The primary market does not need more or different procedures to allocate the capacity, the primary market needs capacity. Therefore efforts should rather be spend on investigating how regulation can stimulate investment.

Annex 1 Abbreviations

GRI N/N-W: Gas Regional Initiative North/North-West

TSO: Transmission System Operator

IR: Ireland

UK: United Kingdom

F: France

G: Germany

B: Belgium

NL: the Netherlands

N: Norway

DK: Denmark

S: Sweden

BG: Bord Gais

EGT: E.ON Gastransport AG & Co. KG

GTS: Gas Transport Services B.V.

GDFDT: Gaz de France Deutschland Transport GmbH

EWEN: EWE Netz GmbH

RWETNG: RWE Transportnetz Gas GmbH

GRTgaz: GRTgaz SA

FL: Fluxys SA

GSC: Gassco AS

NN: Nova Naturgas AB

ENDK: Energinet.dk

NG: National Grid Plc

IC: Interconnector (UK) Ltd.

BEBTS: BEB Transport und Speicher Service GmbH

WT: Wingas Transport GmbH & Co. KG

Annex 2 Questionnaire

PART A - PRIMARY MARKET

1. CAPACITY PRODUCTS AND SERVICES OFFERED TO THE MARKET AT THE INTERCONNECTION POINT

4.1. What types of primary capacity are offered at the interconnection point?

	<i>Entry Capacity</i>		<i>Exit Capacity</i>	
	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
Is there <i>daily firm capacity</i> offered?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is there <i>daily interruptible capacity</i> offered?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is there <i>monthly firm capacity</i> offered?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is there <i>monthly interruptible capacity</i> offered?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is there <i>yearly firm capacity</i> offered?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is there <i>yearly interruptible capacity</i> offered?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is there <i>multiyear firm capacity</i> offered?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Is there <i>multiyear interruptible capacity</i> offered?	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

4.2. Are there other products offered (in terms of duration and in general)?

4.3. Please provide quantitative data on capacities at the interconnection point in 2005 in kWh/h (Vn). If the numbers changed during the respective month please give the minimum and maximum figure.



	Maximum Technical Entry Capacity	Maximum Technical Exit Capacity	Firm Entry Capacity	Firm Exit Capacity	Contracted Firm Entry Capacity	Contracted Firm Exit Capacity	Available Firm Entry Capacity	Available Firm Exit Capacity	Interruptible Entry Capacity	Interruptible Exit Capacity	Contracted Interruptible Entry Capacity	Contracted Interruptible Exit Capacity	Available Interruptible Entry Capacity	Available Interruptible Exit Capacity
J														
F														
M														
A														
M														
J														
J														
A														
S														
O														
N														
D														

2. CAPACITY BOOKING PROCEDURES

5.1. What is the booking procedure applied at the interconnection point?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
Online booking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Auction	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Others, please specify...		

5.2. When can shippers book capacity at the interconnection point? Please answer for each type of product offered.

<i>In days</i>	<i>Entry Capacity</i>	<i>Exit Capacity</i>
<i>Daily firm capacity</i> is offered		
<i>Daily interruptible capacity</i> is offered		
<i>Monthly firm capacity</i> is offered		
<i>Monthly interruptible capacity</i> is offered		
<i>Yearly firm capacity</i> is offered		
<i>Yearly interruptible capacity</i> is offered		
<i>Multiyear firm capacity</i> is offered		
<i>Multiyear interruptible capacity</i> is offered		

5.3. Can shippers book Entry and Exit capacities to each TSO *separately*?



	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
Shippers book Entry and Exit capacities separately to each TSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5.4. Are booking procedures coordinated *between neighbouring TSO*, so that shippers are in contact in contact with only one party?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities from only one TSO	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Shippers can book Entry and Exit capacities via a third party (e. g. agent, train ticket)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

5.5. If yes, please explain how booking procedures are coordinated between neighbouring TSOs and/or which is the party/TSO to which shippers need to book Entry and Exit capacities.

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6. PHYSICAL CONGESTION AND CAPACITY ALLOCATION MECHANISMS (CAM)

6.1. Please provide quantitative data on minimum and maximum utilization rates in 2005 (flow as a percentage of total technical capacity).

	Entry capacity		Exit capacity	
	Minimum utilization rate	Maximum utilization rate	Minimum utilization rate	Maximum utilization rate
January				
February				
March				
April				
May				
June				
July				
August				
September				
October				
November				
December				

6.2. Existing Capacity

6.2.2. What is/are the applied capacity allocation mechanism(s) for existing capacities? Please specify if the capacity allocation mechanism(s) applied is/are legally required.

	<i>Applied?</i>		<i>Legally required?</i>	
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
First-Come-First-Served...	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Open Subscription with Pro rata	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Open Subscription with ranking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other mechanism applied:				

6.2.3. Is/Are allocation mechanism(s) applied for existing capacity coordinated between adjacent TSOs?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6.2.4. If yes, please explain how.



6.3. New Capacity

6.3.1. Are there planned increases in capacities? Please provide details.

6.3.2. If yes, are new capacities already allocated?

6.3.3. What is/are the capacity allocation mechanism(s) for new capacities? Please specify if the capacity allocation mechanism(s) is/are legally required.

	<i>Applied?</i>		<i>Legally required?</i>	
	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
Auction	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Open Season with pro rata	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Open Season with ranking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other mechanism applied:				

6.3.4. Is/Are short-term allocation mechanism(s) for new capacity coordinated between adjacent TSOs?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6.3.5. If yes, please explain how they are coordinated.

6.4. Auctions

6.4.1. How often did you undertake auctions at the interconnection point since 2000?

6.4.2. To what extent (in percentage of existing/planned total technical capacity) have auctions been undertaken?



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6.4.3. Please specify if there is a (legally binding) threshold (e.g. utilisation rate/status of booking) to start an auction?

--

6.4.4. Have auctions been coordinated with adjacent TSOs?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

6.4.5. If yes, please explain how.

--

6.4.6. Is an auctioning of day-ahead capacity implemented and feasible? If not, please explain.

	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
Day-ahead capacity implemented	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Day-ahead capacity not implemented but feasible	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Day-ahead capacity not implemented, not feasible: please explain why:		

7. CONTRACTUAL CONGESTION AND CONGESTION MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES (CMP)

7.1. Please provide quantitative data on rates of subscription (booked firm capacity as a percentage of total technical capacity) in 2007.

Rate of Subscription *Rate of Subscription*
 (% , Entry Capacity) (% , Exit Capacity)

January		
February		
March		
April		
May		
June		
July		
August		
September		
October		
November		
December		

7.2. At which stage of contractual congestion (level of utilization in percentage of booking capacity) is a congestion management procedure to be applied (if relevant)?

7.3. What is/are the capacity congestion procedure(s) applied? Please specify if the capacity congestion procedure(s) is/are legally required.

	<i>Applied?</i>		<i>Legally required?</i>	
	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>	<i>yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Firm Use-It-Or-Lose-It (UIOLI)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interruptible Use-It-Or-Lose-It (UIOLI)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Secondary Market	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Other mechanism applied:				

7.4. Short-term and long-term Use-It-Or-Lose-It (UIOLI)

7.4.1. Is there a short-term and/or long-term UIOLI in place?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>No</i>
Firm short-term UIOLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interruptible short-term UIOLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Firm long-term UIOLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interruptible long-term UIOLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



7.4.2. What is the amount of capacity that is seized on a monthly basis by the application of the UIOLI mechanism?

2005	<i>January</i>	<i>February</i>	<i>March</i>	<i>April</i>	<i>May</i>	<i>June</i>	<i>July</i>	<i>August</i>	<i>September</i>	<i>October</i>	<i>November</i>	<i>December</i>

7.4.3. After how much time will the short-term UIOLI take effect? (definition of “short-term”)

7.4.4. Will a day-ahead “zero-nomination” lead to an UIOLI?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>No</i>
	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

7.4.5. Are short-term and/or long-term UIOLI coordinated between adjacent TSOs?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
Short-term UIOLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Long-term UIOLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

7.4.6. If yes, please explain how.

8. NOMINATION, RE-NOMINATION AND MATCHING PROCEDURES

8.1. Are Easee-gas procedures for nomination, re-nomination and matching implemented?

	<i>yes</i>	<i>no</i>
Nomination	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Re-nomination	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Matching	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

8.2. If not, do they match?

8.3. Do you have any suggestions to improve the current primary market?

8.4. Do you have other information concerning the primary market that were not asked but that you consider of importance?



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Annex 3: UIOLI definitions³⁸

Firm (or formal) long-term Use-It-Or-Lose-It: the Firm long-term UIOLI mechanism is the re-allocation of *calculated unused firm capacity* of existing shipper A for a specific period of time in the past. The TSO or the NRA looks at the historical flow pattern of shipper A and on the basis of this estimates the firm capacity that shipper A will not use during the contracted period. The TSO re-offers this capacity to another shipper B on the *primary market* as *firm capacity*. In term of capacity rights, shipper A loses capacity (shipper A is not compensated with a refund for the amount of capacity reclaimed), while shipper B receives firm capacity. In term of financial aspects, shipper A loses capacity while shipper B pays tariff of *firm capacity*.

Interruptible (or informal) long-term Use-It-Or-Lose-It: the interruptible long-term UIOLI mechanism is the *re-allocation of calculated unused firm capacity* of existing shipper A for a specific period of time in the past. The TSO or the NRA looks at the historical flow pattern of shipper A and on the basis of this estimates the firm capacity that shipper A will not use during the contracted period. The TSO re-offers this capacity to another shipper B on the *primary market* as *interruptible capacity*. In term of capacity rights, shipper A loses capacity (shipper A is not compensated with a refund for the amount of capacity reclaimed) while shipper B receives firm capacity. In term of financial aspects, shipper A loses capacity while shipper B pays tariff of *interruptible capacity*.

- **Interruptible short-term Use-It-Or-Lose-It:** the Interruptible short-term UIOLI mechanism is the *re-allocation of non-nominated firm capacity* of existing shipper. The TSO or the NRA re-offers this capacity to another holder B on the *primary market* as *interruptible capacity*. In term of capacity rights, shipper A holds firm capacity (possible re-nomination) while shipper B holds interruptible capacity. In term of financial aspects, shipper A pays tariff for firm capacity while shipper B pays tariff reflecting interruption probability.
- **Firm short-term Use-It-Or-Lose-It:** the firm short-term UIOLI mechanism is the *re-allocation of non-nominated firm capacity* of existing shipper A. The TSO or the NRA re-offers this capacity to another holder B on the *primary market* as *interruptible capacity*. In term of capacity rights, shipper A holds firm capacity (possible re-nomination) while shipper B holds interruptible capacity. In term of financial aspects, shipper A pays tariff for firm capacity while shipper B pays tariff reflecting interruption probability.

³⁸ As used in questionnaires sent out to TSO's in 2006.